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Wrongful Life in the Age of CRISPR-CAS:
Using the Legal Fiction of “The Conceptual
Being” to Redress Wrongful Gamete
Manipulation
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer J.D., M.A., Ph.D.*
ABSTRACT

Virtually all ‘wrongful life’ actions (claims brought by children for
pre-birth injuries) are denied. The basis for this doctrine pivots around the
refusal to allow recompense for actions which cause harm, but also result
in the child’s birth. We, therefore, are faced with a legal lacuna, where
children suffering serious harms as a result of the latest reproductive
technologies are legal orphans. This Article details the avenues of potential
harm caused by modern reproductive technologies, which I call wrongful
genetic manipulation (WGM), where the injured child would have no right
of action. To address this void, I create a novel remedy via a legal fiction,
“the conceptual being,” which would enable these children to bypass
current restrictions and claim an expanded class of damages, including
pain and suffering, emotional injury, and unjust enrichment.

*About the author: Dr. Billauer holds academic appointments at the University of
Porto, Portugal, where she is a Professor in the International Program on Bioethics, and the
Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., where she is a research Professor of
Scientific Statecraft. She has advanced degrees in law and public health and sits on the
UNESCO committee currently compiling a Casebook on Bioethics. She has also edited
Professor Amnon Carmi’s Casebook on Bioethics for Judges. Prior to transitioning to
academia, Dr. Billauer practiced medical malpractice, toxic tort, and products liability law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the advice and comments of Professors Norman A.
Bailey, Yaniv Heled, and David Heyd. The author, however, bears full responsibility for
the content of this Article.
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“[P]recedents survive in the law long after the use they once served is at
an end and the reason for them has been forgotten. The result of
following them must often be failure and confusion . . . .”1 – Oliver
Wendell Holmes
I.

INTRODUCTION

Four days after Thanksgiving, 2018, the world was stunned to learn
that an American-educated Chinese scientist named He Jiankui (Heh Jeean-qway), altered the genes2 of twin girls, Lulu and Nana.3 Using the
CRISPR-Cas 9 technology, the scientist removed a portion of a gene
responsible for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) development. In
Nana, he removed both copies of the gene CCR5,4 ostensibly conferring
HIV immunity on the child. In Lulu, only one copy was removed—which
would still leave her vulnerable to the disease. The world was outraged
and He Jiankui is apparently under some form of arrest.5
While the world sorts through the ethical concerns,6 let us take a look
at the legal dilemmas in a thought-experiment involving hypothetical
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009)
(1881).
2. See Helen C. O’Neill & Jacques Cohen, Live Births Following Genome Editing in
Human Embryos: A Call for Clarity, Self-Control and Regulation, 38 REPROD.
BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 131, 131 (2019) (“Despite doubts over the veracity of the claims,
there is decent evidence to suggest that Jiankui He and his team have indeed edited
embryos, and transferred the embryos to patients with the intention to establish pregnancy.
This intent is cause for great concern.”).
3. See Marilynn Marchione, Chinese researcher claims first gene-edited babies, AP
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/2r4cvyn.
4. C-C motif chemokine receptor 5 (gene/pseudogene) is associated with resistance
to HIV. See CCR5 gene, Genetics Home Reference, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
5. See Mindy Weisberger, Chinese Scientist Who Claimed to Edit Babies’ Genes May
Be Under House Arrest, LIVE SCI. (Jan. 3, 2019), http://bit.ly/2sgsqOa; see also Xavier
Symons, He Jiankui Fired, accused of forging ethics review, BIOEDGE (Jan. 28, 2019),
http://bit.ly/2XLfQlz (noting that He Jiankui has also been fired from his position at the
Southern University of Science and Technology). “At the end of last year, he was sentenced
to three years in jail and fined Rmb3m ($430,000).” See Hannah Kuchler, Jennifer Doudna,
Crispr scientist, on the ethics of editing human, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://on.ft.com/3bdgI8S.
6. See O’Neill & Cohen, supra note 2, at 132 (“In the UK and the USA, it is illegal
to implant genome-edited human embryos . . . . [B]ut a National Academy of Science
(NAS) Report . . . published in 2016, advised in favour of applying cytoplasmic donation
in women at risk for transmitting mitochondrial disease. In the UK, . . . the Nuffield
Council on Bioethics (2018) . . . report on ‘Human Genome Editing and Human
Reproduction’, . . . goes further than the NAS report, stating that they found no categorical
moral objection to germline genome editing . . . [and] set[s] out principles upon which the
technology might be permitted in some circumstances.”); see also NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, at
vii (2018), available at https://bit.ly/2tdxDXq (noting in the updated report that “[t]he
central question which this Report sets out to address is whether such [gene-editing]
interventions would be ethically acceptable. Our conclusion is that [such] interventions . . .
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twins re-named Nulu and Lana.7 Flash forward 25 years: Nulu,
misunderstanding the efficacy of the procedure, engages in unprotected
sex and becomes infected with HIV. Lana has given birth to a son who
suffers some horrific disease—perhaps something like Lesch-Nyhan
syndrome (caused by a mutation of the HPRT gene)8 as a consequence of
his mother’s genetic alteration. Putting aside the statute of limitations
issues: Can the sisters sue? Can Lana’s son sue?
The short answer is: no, at least as the law stands today.
Theoretically, various breaches of the standard of care undoubtedly
could be leveled against the doctor, e.g., in Nulu’s case for failure to
perform the procedure properly. In all three situations, one could claim a
lack of informed consent, a failure to comply with internal rules and
regulations prohibiting these procedures, and a failure to conform to the
general standard of care in the medical (genetics) community.
Nevertheless, the claims would all fail.
In Nulu’s case, the claim would fail on causation grounds.9 Although
Nulu might be able to claim she was misled and prove the
misrepresentation led her to become infected, the causal connection is
tenuous: Nulu’s hypothetical HIV was not directly caused by the
procedure. In Lana’s case, any claim would fail on the damage issue, as
most courts disallow wrongful life claims, which is a claim related to her
being born. In Lana’s son’s case, the claim might fail on lack of duty
grounds.10
But in the case of Lana’s son—we have a compound problem. Had
the doctor not performed the procedure on Lana, her embryo would not
have been implanted and she never would have been born—and hence she
could be ethically acceptable, provided . . . two principles are satisfied: first, that such
interventions are intended to secure, and are consistent with, the welfare of a person who
may be born as a consequence, and second, that any such interventions would uphold
principles of social justice and solidarity”); see generally Carolyn Brokowski, Do CRISPR
Germline Ethics Statements Cut It?, 1 CRISPR J. 115 (2018), available at
http://bit.ly/37VnZIK (reviewing 61 ethics commentaries on gene-editing).
7. See The He Lab, About Lulu and Nana: Twin Girls Born Healthy After Gene
Surgery as Single-Cell Embryos, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://bit.ly/2qOf4rF (noting
that the twins are being called Nana and Lulu “to protect their privacy”).
8. See Rosa J. Torres & Juan G. Puig, Hypoxanthine-guanine
phosophoribosyltransferase (HPRT) deficiency: Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, 2 ORPHANET J.
RARE DISEASES, Dec. 8, 2007, at 1, 6, available at http://bit.ly/2nKvijV.
9. See Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right
to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All But One, 64 MO. L. REV.
29, 52 (1999) (noting that “an individual who does not interfere with the body’s natural
processes will be immune from liability if an adverse result occurs”).
10. See Viccaro v. Milunksy, 551 N.E.2d. 8, 12–13 (Mass. 1990) (rejecting the child’s
claim for wrongful life for failure to diagnose his mother’s heritable genetic condition on
duty grounds, while allowing the mother’s claim for wrongful birth). But see Monusko v.
Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing recovery for the child’s
claim in a pre-conception tort case, noting that a duty to a plaintiff who was not in being at
the time of a wrongful act does exist).
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couldn’t sue. Of course, if Lana hadn’t been born, neither would her son.
And, as most courts rejecting similar claims have said, it is better to be
born with a disease than not to be born at all.11 The thought that Lana’s
son would never have been born at all—regardless of horrific injuries
associated with a hypothetical Lesch-Nyhan syndrome12—is an anathema
to the courts, hence his claim, as well as his mother’s, fails under the
prevailing judicial sentiment rejecting wrongful life claims.13 Moreover,
because Lana herself would never have been born but for the genetic
intervention, she would be denied her claim of wrongful birth (the parents’
claim for the costs incident to raising a disabled child), which is typically
allowed,14 even as the child’s claim for wrongful life is not.
For many, new technologies provide a dream-fulfilled, enabling
“barren” parents to have a child. For some, the end results are a nightmare.
Among the most heartbreaking are those where the designated embryo is
implanted in the “wrong parent.”15 At least one such case resulted in a

11. See, e.g., Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 275 (E.D. Pa. 2009); infra
notes 147–48 and accompanying text; see also Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811–
12 (N.Y. 1978).
12. The disease usually occurring almost exclusively in males, manifesting in
moderate cognitive disability, and self-immolation. People with Lesch Nyhan syndrome
usually cannot walk, require assistance sitting and generally die in the first or second
decade of life. See Lesch Nyhan syndrome, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://bit.ly/37vOhRd
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
13. See Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 269 & n.7 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)
(noting that “Georgia law recognizes only those claims in which the alleged negligence
resulted in undesired conception,” concepts which the judge commingles with wrongful
birth); see also Final Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Collins v. Xytex
Corp., No. 2015-CV-259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2–3 (Ga. Super. Oct. 20, 2015)
(authored by the same judge deciding the lower level Norman case, who therein stated,
“[t]his claim most closely . . . fits a claim for wrongful birth – and so is not allowed. The
reason for this is . . . [that] courts are ‘unwilling to say that life, even life with severe
impairments, may ever amount to a legal injury’”); Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, The
Sperminator as a Public Nuisance: Redressing Wrongful Birth and Life Claims in New
Ways (Aka New Tricks for Old Torts), 42 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 1 (2019)
[hereinafter Billauer, Sperminator] (suggesting such the children’s claims for wrongful life
be brought under public nuisance theory if the resultant injury presents a public health
hazard, as well as an individual harm).
14. Although not in Georgia. See Norman, 830 S.E.2d at 269–70. But see Barbara
Pfeffer Billauer, Re-Birthing Wrongful Birth Claims in the Age of IVF and Abortion
Reforms, 50 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2020) (manuscript at 8–9) [hereinafter
Billauer, Re-Birthing], available at http://bit.ly/34qDq9T (discussing, inter alia, the impact
of abortion reform on the rights of redress for wrongful birth claims, with specific focus on
the sub-genre of cases, where the physician improperly performs a sterilization procedure
resulting in the birth of a healthy child).
15. See ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd. [2017] SGCA 20 (Sing.) (describing a
Caucasian couple who sought IVF intervention to create a child born from gametogenic
material of both parents, but instead, the IVF facility substituted the intended sperm with
that of a non-Caucasian male, resulting in the birth of a mixed-race child); see also Sarah
Gregory, US couple launch lawsuit after ancestry test reveals sperm mix-up, BIONEWS
(Aug. 12, 2019), http://bit.ly/2rp4R5n.
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protracted custody dispute.16 As to how much the child suffered from the
two-year shuttle between biological parents and gestational mother, it is
too early to tell. However, it appears this child, too, has no redress—at
least not against the sperm bank causing the problem. Other cases exist
where children are born with horrible genetic diseases17 or a highly
increased risk of serious mental illness due to sperm bank error.18 These
children, too, are currently denied recompense.19
For the past 50 years, American courts generally have refused to hold
doctors (or sperm banks) liable to unwanted children,20 whether born
diseased or not.21 Most often, the precipitating cause in these cases was the
failure to properly abort, sterilize, or inform the parent of genetic problems
suffered by the child, thereby depriving the parents of the freedom to avoid
having children—or denial of their right to abortion.22 The latter group of
cases uniformly pivot around the fact that the defendant’s acts did not
actually cause the harm.
The reasons articulated for rejecting the child’s wrongful life claim
range from judicial fear of entering some philosophical quagmire
regarding “whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies,”23 to the concern of offending the
disabled community,24 to reliance on Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem
16. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 723 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001);
Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
17. See Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2009); see also
Ariana Eunjung Cha, The Children of Donor H898, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2019, 4:06 PM),
https://wapo.st/2ppswSC.
18. See, e.g., Final Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Collins v. Xytex
Corp., No. 2015-CV-259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *3 (Ga. Super. Oct. 20, 2015).
19. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 25–26 (examining the lacuna in legal
remedies in wrongful birth and wrongful life cases, and contemplating solutions).
20. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (the first
recorded case involving a wrongful life claim, here concerning an illegitimate child suing
his father for being born); see also Strasser, supra note 9, at 33–34.
21. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 23–24; see also Chen Meng Lam,
Damages for Wrongful Fertilisation: Reliance on Policy Considerations, 24 DEAKIN L.
REV. 139, 142 (2019).
22. See Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 7–12.
23. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978); see also Greco v.
United States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995) (rejecting the wrongful life claims of a child
born with congenital injuries due to negligent failure to diagnose rubella in utero and allow
the mother the opportunity to abort the fetus) (citing Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812).
24. See Sagit Mor, The Dialectics of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Claims in
Israel: A Disability Critique, 63 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 113, 115, 118, 120, 131–36
(2014); see also Jillian T. Stein, Backdoor Eugenics: The Troubling Implications of
Certain Damages Awards in “Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims, 40 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2010) (noting that wrongful birth suits “stigmatize[] the disabled
community by implying that parents and disabled children are harmed by the deprivation
of the free exercise of procreative choice when a birth results in a disabled child . . .”);
Sofia Yakren, “Wrongful Birth” Claims and the Paradox of Parenting a Child with a
Disability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 583 n.23 (2018) (“Actions like ones for wrongful
birth that lead to the vilification of handicapped persons should be denied on policy
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(“NIP”),25 another philosophical approach. In these cases, courts have said
that no damages exist, as any life is better than none,26 refusing to
countenance the full impact of denial of the parental right of abortion.
These holdings have infected cases where the negligence did, in fact, cause
the harm, and abortion was not the sought-after alternative. Thus, the
present state-of-affairs is that children born with genetic diseases as a
direct consequence of reckless genomic manipulation or negligent supply
of defective genetic material are denied legal recourse.
Enter He Jiankui. We can assume he will be crucified, if only by the
court of public opinion. We can also presume the promulgation of
advisories, recommendations, and regulations of various degrees of
enforceability banning the procedure, at least temporarily.27 But that will
not help Nulu, Lana or her son—or the progeny of any other (rogue)
investigator. These children will simply suffer without redress. And the
outcry will have little impact on legal doctrine. More issues incident to
intentional manipulation of the genome, selection of designer-gene babies,
attempts to “fix the helix,” and reckless perpetration of genetic errors via
in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) are sure to unfold. Unfortunately, the law does
not have a viable remedy in sight.
Isn’t it time the law caught up with technology?
The rejection of wrongful life claims is well-settled and wellresearched.28 Others have attempted to remedy the legal lacuna in the
child’s rights—to no effect. Recent articles address the situation based on

grounds alone,” (quoting Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful
Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 535, 609–10 (1995))). Similarly, many disability rights advocates agree that
prenatal testing and selective abortion, which are promoted by wrongful birth suits,
stigmatize disability. See Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, Disability Rights Critique of
Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and recommendation, in PRENATAL TESTING AND
DISABILITY RIGHTS 3, 12–17 (1999).
25. The Parfit Non-Identity Problem has been used by courts to argue that children
born as a result of negligence (for example, a negligent tubal ligation resulting in
pregnancy), have no wrongful life tort claim. The doctrine claims that as the child would
not have existed but for the negligence, he suffers no injury. See W. Ryan Schuster, Rights
Gone Wrong: A Case Against Wrongful Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2329, 2356–62,
2356 n.137 (2016); see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–61, 366–71, 374–
79 (1986); infra Part IV.
26. See, e.g., Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d,
374 F. App’x 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
27. See Brokowski, supra note 6, at 1.
28. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic
Counseling: A Dissent to the “Wrongful Life” Debate, 48 IND. L. J. 581, 598–99 (1973);
Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618,
622-25, 634–36 (1979); see generally Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth in the United States and England, 17 Loy. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 535 (1995); Patrick J. Kelly, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and
Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (1979); G. Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for
“Wrongful Life,” 1 ISR. REV. 465 (1967).
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the philosophical underpinnings—i.e., Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem, (the
NIP)29 but the argument is based on a faulty understanding of the
philosophy, as I demonstrate here, and hence, must fail on its face.
Most recently, Professor Dov Fox proposed a very intriguing and
novel cause of action, called Reproductive Negligence,30 which focuses on
the mother’s claims. Professor Fox’s article was written before He
Jiankui’s exploits laid bare the bizarre situation where a childbearing a
genetic disease could be created through the fault of a third party, yet have
no legal recourse.31 It remains to be seen how this new claim can be
calibrated to address the latest techno-glitches. A 1999 article by Professor
Mark Strasser presented a different, holistic understanding of the situation;
looking at the child’s claim as well as the mother’s. Therein, Professor
Strasser explains that the legal reasoning rejecting the wrongful life claim
is specious.32 But most courts reject Professor Strasser’s analysis.
Nevertheless, the flaws in legal reasoning that Professor Strasser raises
have become even more apparent and egregious in light of modern
reproductive technology, and its resultant children.
This Article addresses the child’s claims for harms caused by these
newer technologies, e.g., where the harm is caused by direct—but faulty—
manipulation of DNA-base pairs via genetic engineering, or even via
older, currently popular technologies such as Pre-Implantation Genetic
Testing (“PGT”),33 embryo selection and implantation via IVF, or where
switched, defective, or inappropriate gametes are supplied for the purposes
of embryo creation.34 The latter class of cases might arise due to failure to
vet or screen gamete-suppliers or properly test gametogenic material, or
due to methodological deficiencies in the technique itself.35 Currently
29. See, e.g., W. Ryan Schuster, Rights Gone Wrong: A Case Against Wrongful Life,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2329, 2356–62 (2016) (rejecting Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl’s views
on the Non Identity Problem from a rights standpoint as discussed in Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 397
(2002)).
30. See generally Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149
(2017) (proposing a novel tort theory that broadens the existing parameters of negligence
claims pertaining to reproductive claims, as well as incorporating various malpractice
theories under the umbrella concept he proposes).
31. See infra Section III.A.
32. Strasser, supra note 9, at 75–76.
33. See infra notes 50, 51, and Section II.A.
34. For example, those causing or likely to cause heritable diseases in future
generations which may not be noticeable or observable in the first generation of
transmission.
35. See Patricio Ventura-Juncá et al., In vitro fertilization (IVF) in mammals:
epigenetic and developmental alterations. Scientific and bioethical implications for IVF in
humans,
48
BIOLOGICAL
RES.,
Dec.
18.,
2015,
at
1,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4684609/; see also Epigenetics: Can IVF
affect your baby’s genes?, YOUR IVF JOURNEY, https://bit.ly/2QAwalR (last visited Dec.
30, 2019); Rachel Montgomery, IVF temporarily changes babies’ epigenetics, BIONEWS
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2tfKh8t.
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enveloped within the ambit of wrongful life, these harms result in disease,
disability, or increased risk thereof in the resultant child, causing pain,
suffering, and emotional angst. In conjunction with other articles I have
written,36 this Article is the first to propose how existing law and legal
theory can be used to address the current legal lacuna. In this Article, I
create a legal fiction, the conceptual being, to bring a damage suit under
the guise of a recognized claim of pre-conception tort.37 To avoid being
prey to the toxic atmosphere surrounding the words wrongful life (which
conjures the courts’ abortion-abhorrence), I will henceforth use the term
wrongful genetic manipulation (“WGM”) to describe these cases.
Part I of this Article introduces the legal problems presented by the
current technology. Part II provides an overview of the relevant medical
procedures that can “give birth” to abuses, and illustrates the ensuing legal
problems presented by current law. Part III revisits Professor Strasser’s
approach, illustrating the faulty reasoning rejecting the older wrongful life
claims in the modern context. Additionally, Part III disentangles past dicta
and relates these arguments to children born of WGM (whether via faulty
sperm supply, IVF, preimplantation testing, or genetic manipulation à la
He Jiankui), demonstrating the dicta-factual mismatch. Part IV goes
further and explores the misuse and misunderstanding of Parfit’s Non
Identity Problem (NIP), a discussion that has thus far not been properly
addressed in the legal context. Part IV also explains that Parfit, himself,
would have championed recovery for Lana and her son, as well as
illustrates the inherent inconsistency of rejecting wrongful life, but
allowing wrongful birth claims in these cases, the current state of the law.38
Part V offers a novel solution to redress harms wrongfully created by
WGM. I do so by creating a legal fiction, the conceptual being, authorized
to bring suit for WGM on behalf of the harmed child. This legal entity can
now seek an expanded retinue of damages including pain, suffering,
emotional angst, medical monitoring, and unjust enrichment.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC MANIPULATION
Advances in assisted reproductive technologies (“ART”)39 have
progressed exponentially in the years following the IVF of Louise Brown
36. See generally Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14 (discussing the incongruity of
rejecting conventional remedies in wrongful birth cases); Billauer, Sperminator, supra note
13 (discussing lack of remedies for pre-birth wrongs occasioned by IVF facilities).
37. See infra Section V.B.
38. See generally Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14 (discussing the anachronistic
reasoning behind precluding wrongful birth cases disallowing damages for unwanted
children who are born healthy).
39. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Protection (“CDC”), assisted
reproductive technology (“ART”) consists of all clinical treatments and laboratory
procedures conducted with the intent of conceiving, such as in vitro fertilization (“IVF”),
sperm, oocyte, or embryo donation, and gestational surrogacy. See Implementation of the
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in 1978.40 Newer technologies, such as intracytoplasmic sperm
injection(“ICSI”), 41 mitochondrial transfer (colloquially known as “threeparent-children”),42 and in vitro gametogenesis (“IVG”) via somatic cell
nuclear transfer (“SCNT”),43 are gaining notice.44 “Tandem IVF” is
marketed to attract older women with low fertility.45 Uterine transplants
open the door for men to become pregnant.46 As of this writing, the first
transplantation of a uterus from a deceased donor enabled a woman to give
birth.47
A.

Pre-Implantation Genetic Testing (PGT)

Non-negligently caused genetic diseases in neonates are commonly
attributed to the age-related quality of parental gametogenic materials or
family history of disease. Non-technology- driven harm—which may or
may not be negligent—may also accrue via, for example, administration
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 – A Model Program for the
Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 64 FED. REG. 39,374 (July 21, 1999).
40. See JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 5, 19, 185 (2017).
41. See June Shannon, Starting a Family: the different types of IVF, IRISH TIMES (Feb.
20, 2016, 3:08 AM), https://bit.ly/2likdWF.
42. See Michael Cook, Tandem IVF: anything to guarantee a baby, BIOEDGE (Aug.
26, 2017), https://bit.ly/2lykDIv.
43. See Hannah Bourne et al., Procreative Beneficence and In Vitro Gametogenesis,
30 MONASH BIOETHICS REV. 29, 30–31 (2012) (noting “[r]ecent research suggests that it
may become possible to derive gametes (eggs and sperm) from human stem cells in vitro,
a process which we will term in vitro gametogenesis (“IVG”). IVG would allow the
creation of stems cells from a patient’s somatic (body) cells, and these stems cells could
then be used to generate a plentiful supply of eggs or sperm in the laboratory”).
44. See generally Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent IVF: Gene Replacement for the
Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial Diseases, 101 FERTILITY & STERILITY 31 (2014)
(discussing the technique involved in implanting the nuclear genome from the pronuclear
stage zygote of a woman affected with mitochondrial disease in an enucleated donor
zygote).
45. See Cook, supra note 42. In Tandem IVF, which is used in women over 40, the
woman’s own eggs are fertilized and combined with donor embryos. In cytoplasmic
tandem IVF, the nucleus of the mother’s egg is injected into an enucleated donor egg to
rejuvenate it. This practice is banned by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).
Id.; see also Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy: Considering the Future of U.S. Policy
on “Three-Parent IVF,” HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://bit.ly/36bZPIW (providing videos and a written summary of a panel policy
discussion, which reviewed “the latest technological developments, the regulatory barriers,
and the ethical challenges affecting the clinical application of MRT”); Emily Mullin,
Patient advocates and scientists launch push to lift ban on “three-parent IVF,” STAT
(Apr. 16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2sqoCKK (“In the U.S., the procedure is effectively banned
because of a congressional amendment passed in 2015 that’s been renewed every year
since.”).
46. See Dani Ejzenberg et al., Livebirth after uterus transplantation from a deceased
donor in a recipient with uterine infertility, 392 LANCET 2697, 2704 (2018).
47. For the First Time in North America, a Woman Gives Birth After Uterus
Transplant From a Deceased Donor, HEALTH ESSENTIALS: CLEVELAND CLINIC (July 9,
2019), https://cle.clinic/30VNHd0.
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of oocyte-stimulating hormones as a component of ART.48 Similarly,
congenital harm can also be caused by negligent failure to properly
implement technologically-driven medical interventions, as discussed
below.
Until recently, detecting congenital abnormalities was limited to
prenatal diagnosis involving examining fetal images, or testing embryonic
fluid or fetal tissue. The most familiar techniques (in increasing order of
risk) are ultrasound, amniocentesis, and chorionic villous sampling.49 In
these cases, the fetus is usually well on its way toward personhood, as the
techniques cannot be performed until the pregnancy is well on its way—
the fifth week for ultrasound, and fifteen weeks for amniocentesis. At this
stage, the physician’s negligence takes the form of failing to recommend
testing or providing wrongful information of test results, thereby depriving
the parents of the right of abortion. It is these cases from which the dogma
rejecting wrongful life claims was born.
Added to the technologies of baby-making, are emerging tools for
both baby-selection and pre-baby repair which increase the likelihood of
negligent interventions.50 These include biopsy-facilitated PGT,51 noninvasive preimplantation screening (“NIPS”),52 intra-pregnancy fetal48. See Santiago Munné, Status of preimplantation genetic testing and embryo
selection, 37 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 393, 394 (2018) (“One potential source of
aneuploidy rate variability is hormonal stimulation . . . .”); see also Ernesto Bosch et al.,
Regimen of ovarian stimulation affects oocyte and therefore embryo quality, 105 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 560, 562 (2016).
49. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 265, 278 (2003).
50. The older term “preimplantation genetic diagnosis” (“PGD”) referred to
situations where either or both parents have a known genetic abnormality and testing is
performed to determine if the embryo also carries a genetic abnormality. “Preimplantation
genetic screening” (“PGS”) also referred to techniques where embryos from presumed
chromosomally-normal genetic parents are screened for aneuploidy (an abnormal number
of chromosomes). These terms are no longer used and PGS is now called “preimplantation
genetic testing for aneuploidies” (“PGT-A”). See Botkin, supra note 49, at 280; see also
Chun-Kai Chen et al., New perspectives on preimplantation genetic diagnosis and
preimplantation genetic screening, 53 TAIWANESE J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 146,
146–48 (2014); Munné, supra note 48, at 393–95.
51. See Munné, supra note 48, at 393 (“Since last year, preimplantation genetic
screening (PGS) and preimplantation diagnosis (PGD) were re-termed preimplantation
genetic testing (PGT) . . . .”); see also Martine De Rycke, Singling out genetic disorders
and disease, 2 GENOME MED., NO. 74, Oct. 2010, at 1,1 (noting that PGD was first
performed in 1990, although “so far, no detrimental effects of the procedure have been
observed”); Chen et al., supra note 50, at 146–50. But see Amber R. Cooper & Emily S.
Jungheim, Preimplantation Genetic Testing: Indications and Controversies, 30 CLINICS
LABORATORY MED. 519, 519–31 (2010), available at https://bit.ly/36oAKK0.
52. See C. Farra et al., Non-invasive pre-implantation genetic testing of human
embryos: an emerging concept, 33 HUM. REPROD. 2162, 2162 (2018) (“The accurate
genetic screening of pre-implantation embryos currently entails the use of technically
challenging and biologically invasive biopsies of the human embryos . . . . Circulating cellfree embryonic DNA . . . present in the blastocoel fluid . . . has lately been sought as an
attractive source of genetic information.”).
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reconstructive surgery (also called “prenatal surgery”),53 IVF, where
donor sperm or egg is deliberately selected pre-conception (perhaps via
internet catalog) by a would-be parent based on a set of personal
preferences (i.e., “the parent picks”), and SCNT, which can create an
embryo that is a clone of the parent.54
Where negligent embryo-examination, testing, creation, and
treatment occur pre-gestational onset and result in a child who sustains
injury or harm, that child is impoverished of legal remedy or damages.
Similarly, in cases where the negligence involves passive harm (e.g.,
failure to test the fetus or failure to accurately inform the parents regarding
the test results), and the sought-after remedy is abortion which fails, the
child’s claim would not survive.55 By comparison, where direct and causal
negligence occurs after gestational onset but prior to birth (i.e., during
pregnancy), the born-alive child seeking damages would, in fact, have a
viable cause of action.56 This dichotomy begs for examination.
Of late, due to modern technology, the diagnostic timeline has
advanced. Along with recent innovations comes the additional potential
for harm. Thus, embryo-testing is now being done prior to gestation, with
selecting genetically-preferred embryos for uterine implantation being the
ultimate goal. It is at this stage we begin focusing our investigative lens—
first examining the PGT process,57 which takes place at an IVF center.
Here, donor sperm (either known or procured via a sperm bank) fertilizes
the egg. After reaching the blastocyst stage, “an eight to twelve cell mass
– [one] cell is removed for analysis . . . [and] can then be analyzed to
determine if there are any genetic abnormalities . . . . Embryos without
genetic defects would be transferred to the uterus in hopes of initiating a
pregnancy.”58 This new technology has the ability to select embryos more
53. Prenatal Surgery, ENCYCLOPEDIA CHILD. HEALTH, https://bit.ly/2MHjI2K (last
visited Nov. 30, 2019).
54. See Bourne et al., supra note 43, at 35.
55. See generally Kathleen A. Mahoney, Malpractice Claims Resulting from
Negligent Preconception Genetic Testing: Do These Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful
Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the Categorization Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 773 (2006) (discussing the impact of timing of the negligence on the viability of
the cause of action).
56. See discussion infra Part IV.
57. See Glenn L. Schattman & Kangpu Xu, Preimplantation genetic testing,
UPTODATE, https://bit.ly/2mVbWrV (last updated Dec. 10, 2019) (explaining that there
are three stages of preimplantation genetic testing, and all involve in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”), biopsy of the gametogenic material, testing and transfer of selected fresh or
frozen-thawed embryos into the uterus).
58. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), GENETICS & IVF INST.,
https://bit.ly/2leL8CH (last visited Nov. 30, 2019) (“After embryos are created in the
laboratory, they are grown for five to six days . . . [after which a biopsy] is done on all
appropriately developing embryos. Biopsy involves removing a few cells from the
trophectoderm, or the layer of cells that is ‘hatching out’ of the embryo. . . . The embryos
are stored while genetic material inside the removed cells is tested for abnormalities.”).
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likely to survive pregnancy and produce viable children. However, in
addition to the ability to select preferred genetic material, the procedure
also provides a vehicle to introduce injury and compromise the genetic
material of the nascent embryo. In other words, PGT “requires multiple
steps and manipulations of gametes and embryos in order to select
unaffected embryos for transfer and subsequent potential pregnancy.”59 As
diagnostic techniques become more prevalent and complicated,60 the
potential for error increases.61
Damage to the embryo can occur during an improperly performed
biopsy procedure,62 or cell removal process,63 or via poorly maintained
culture media, or from contaminants in plastic implements.64 Without
standardized protocols, guidelines, and quality control of IVF facilities65
(or gene editing labs), it becomes difficult—if not impossible—to
determine the cause66 and frequency of laboratory-related damage, and
assess what is considered negligence.67 While most laboratories report
good results, the current use of PGT is primarily directed at detecting
abnormalities at the chromosomal level which is easier,68 compared to
59. See Cooper & Jungheim, supra note 51, at 30.
60. See Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic testing of embryos: practices and
perspectives of US in vitro fertilization clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1053, 1053
(2008) (noting that “[m]any clinics currently provide PGD for controversial indications
such as sex selection”).
61. Id. at 1055; see also VICTORIA CHICO, GENOMIC NEGLIGENCE: AN INTEREST IN
AUTONOMY AS THE BASIS FOR NOVEL NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS GENERATED BY GENETIC
TECHNOLOGY 9–10, 73, 139 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2011).
62. See Danilo Cimadomo et al., The Impact of Biopsy on Human Embryo
Developmental Potential during Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2016 BIOMED RES.
INT’L, JAN. 28, 2016, at 1, 2.
63. See Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), HUM. FERTILISATION &
EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, http://bit.ly/2nmxL3L (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (noting that
the UK-based Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority website advises that
“[a]lthough an embryo can develop normally even when it has had a cell removed, there is
a possibility that some embryos may be damaged by testing, which means they would need
to be discarded . . . . In addition, PGD is not 100% accurate so there’s a small chance the
tests may not work or may give the wrong information”).
64. See Munné, supra note 48, at 394; see also David Mortimer et al., Cairo
consensus on the IVF laboratory environment and air quality: report of an expert meeting,
36 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 658, 658 (2018).
65. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 31–34.
66. Poor laboratory practice—without standard q/a-q/c procedures—could also
generate errors. See What is Preimplantation Genetic Screening (PGS)?, FERTILITY
CLINICS ABROAD (Dec. 6, 2016), https://bit.ly/2nn4Qgl (explaining the procedure
involving pipetting embryos); see also IMT Matcher, IMT INT’L at 5, 6,
https://bit.ly/39vtLS8 (describing poorly cleaned pipettes resulting in switched embryos in
IVF treatments).
67. See Heidi Ledford, CRISPR babies: when will the world be ready?, NATURE (June
24, 2019), https://go.nature.com/2Ok0vFG.
68. Munné, supra note 48, at 393–96 (noting that “90% of cases performed are for
PGT for aneuploidies (PGT-A) . . . [and i]n the USA, we estimate that 40% of cycles are
now accompanied by PGT-A, and that number is increasing”).
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testing at the genetic or DNA level. As PGT advances, tests will become
more cumbersome and results more complicated to interpret,69 further
increasing the likelihood of error. Because IVF laboratories are not subject
to the same stringent regulations and enforcement mechanisms applicable
to other public health facilities,70 errors also occur when normal embryos
are incorrectly (read negligently) discarded and abnormal ones
implanted.71 Ethical concerns involving mandatory screening also arise,72
as do concerns regarding eugenic implications.73 Harms resulting from
these activities result in injured children who are, with rare exceptions,
bereft of legal remedy
B.

CRISPR: To Fix the Helix

Newer technologies have the capacity to generate additional benefits
but also may cause additional problems, including at the informed consent
level.74 For the time being, however, many of these techniques are

69. This especially true for tests involving susceptibility genes, such as the BRCA 1,
which while it may increase lifetime risk to 80%, this is only the case in those who are
carriers or who actually develop the disease (that is to say it is a retrospective evaluation,
rather than predictive). Hence, the gene cannot be said to be causal of the disease.
See DENIS ALEXANDER, GENES, DETERMINISM AND GOD 272–73 (2017); see also Embryo
checks “should be widened,” BBC NEWS (May 8, 2006, 11:36 AM), https://bbc.in/2rIgswJ.
70. See Fox, supra note 30, at 152. But see Kuchler, supra note 4 (discussing FDA
oversight of CRISPR studies). See also Cripsr-gene editing regulation tracker, GENETIC
LITERACY PROJECT, https://bit.ly/2T8483T (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
71. Munné, supra note 48, at 394 (noting that typically the error rate is low).
72. See Margaret Fischer, Mandatory legislation for the screening of newborns for
PKU in the United States, 9 MENTAL RETARDATION, no. 5, Oct. 1971, at 25; see also G. J.
Annas, Mandatory PKU screening: the other side of the looking glass, 72 AM. J. PUBLIC
HEALTH 1401–03, Dec. 1982. In the U.K., over 400 conditions have been approved for
screening. See Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), supra note 63.
73. See Embryo checks “should be widened,” supra note 69 (noting that “[t]he [U.K.]
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority currently allows embryos to be screened
for inherited diseases such as cystic fibrosis” and two inherited cancer conditions—familial
adematous polyposis (“FAP”), a type of bowel cancer, and cancer of the retina using preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”). Following a government report recommended
screening for susceptibility genes linked to cancer, stakeholders objected and the director
of the group Comment on Reproductive Ethics said: “PGD is currently nothing more than
a weapon of destruction, aimed at the ruthless elimination of any embryo which does not
conform to eugenic concepts of perfection.” Additionally, Rachel Hurst, of Disability
Awareness in Action, said: “If you say that it’s OK to say that you can eliminate embryos
which would lead to disabled people, you’re saying that disabled people are not people.
And you’re saying that their quality of life is not worth living, which is discriminatory and
extremely prejudicial”); see also DAAR, supra note 40, at 219–61. See generally NHS
COMMISSIONING BD., CLINICAL COMMISSIONING POLICY: PRE-IMPLANTATION GENETIC
DIAGNOSIS (PGD) (2013), http://bit.ly/2nVAemg; Brendan Parent, CRISPR Lit the Fire:
Ethics Must Drive Regulation of Germline Engineering, A.B.A. (June 29, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2ng0zLq.
74. See Sam Sherratt, Podcast Review: Genome edited babies – Science Weekly,
GUARDIAN, BIONEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), http://bit.ly/2mqwd8R (reporting on a panel of
experts’ condemnation of He Jiankui’s genetic manipulation and noting that “[w]hatever
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experimental.75 However, with easy accessibility of CRISPR76, we are no
longer operating in the theoretical realm. And while the technology to
create genetically-preferred children already exists, this technology also
has the potential to introduce harm, at both the genetic and somatic levels.
Moreover, we are not far off from dealing with sequelae of IVG, which
would allow not only genetic tampering, but also the creation of a plentiful
supply of eggs or sperm in the laboratory via a patient’s somatic (body)
cells.77 This technology has the potential not only to allow tinkering with
currently existing genes, but to create gametes, ab initio, with genes of our
own making, opening the door to even more harms.
In the context of genetic manipulation, à la He Jiankui, we just do not
know what can happen. Genome editing, for which CRISPR-Cas is one
tool,78 involves deletions, insertions, or modifications of the genome at a
specific site of a DNA sequence. Gene therapy makes use of this therapy
to eradicate a particular disease by eliminating or “fixing” a gene
responsible. But the technique is not perfect. One report noted that the
CRISPR-Cas 9 technique caused damage (unintended deletions or
rearrangement) in 20% of cells79 and several authors, both legal80 and
scientific,81 have expressed concern over its safety82 and assessment of
the supposed justification for the research, the necessity of informed consent is not
negotiable”).
75. Farra et al., supra note 52, at 2162–67.
76. See CRISPR 101: Your Guide to Understanding Crispr, SYNTHEGO,
https://bit.ly/2lOpcyt (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
77. Bourne et al., supra note 43, at 30.
78. Analogous research concerning the p53 protein claims that the protein “helps
regulate growth and proliferation of cells [acquiring] the nickname ‘the guardian of the
genome.’ Until recently it was believed it protected against carcinogenesis, but it now
seems that a particular form of p53 would have the opposite effect by promoting cancer in
some instances.” See Catharine Paddock, Antitumor protein can sometimes promote
cancer, MED. NEWS TODAY (Feb. 4, 2019), http://bit.ly/2q8vcUP (citing Jinchul Kim et al.,
Wild-Type p53 Promotes Cancer Metabolic Switch by Inducing PUMA-Dependent
Suppression of Oxidative Phosphorylation, 35 CANCER CELL 191 (2019)).
79. The safety of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing is being debated, ECONOMIST (July 19,
2018), at 64, https://econ.st/2OEFOnU (reporting on a study by Allan Bradley published
in Nature Biotechnology). However, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics states that “in some
circumstances the genetic engineering of human sperm, eggs or embryos could be morally
acceptable” for removing heritable diseases or reducing genetic predispositions for
cancer.” NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 6, at 76.
80. See James Lawford Davies, The Regulation of Gene Editing in the United
Kingdom, A.B.A. (June 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/36hgBGo.
81. Melissa Healy, Q&A: Why geneticists say it’s wrong to edit the DNA of embryos
to protect them against HIV, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://lat.ms/2mJpqXS
(reporting on an interview with Dr. Michael Snyder, Director of Stanford University’s
Center for Genomics and Personalized Medicine).
82. See ROBERT PLOMIN, BLUEPRINT: HOW DNA MAKES US WHO WE ARE 132 (2018)
(noting that edited human embryos have not been investigated sufficiently for off-target
editing effects); see also Ledford, supra note 67; Research Highlights: CRISPR, BROAD
INST., http://bit.ly/35P25VQ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019); see also Kuchler, supra note 4,
(noting Dr. Doudna’s concern regarding reassembling the cut DNA base pairs).
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long-range consequences.83 Thus, we know genes are often assigned more
than one job—a phenomenon known as pleiotropism84 (when a single gene
affects a number of observable traits in the same organism).85 But we don’t
know how this plays out at the DNA-level,86 where CRISPR-Cas is
deployed. Although we hope the Cas-enzyme component is unleashed at
the precise target, we cannot be sure that it doesn’t have “off-target
effects.”87 Nor at this point can we be sure that when “knocking out” a
slice of DNA responsible for one deleterious condition, we aren’t
inadvertently causing another.88 Even He Jiankui, who says he “addressed
this concern,” couldn’t be sure—admitting that despite various tests to
make sure this did not happen, “there might be one potential off-target
mutation.”89 And that’s only in the area of the genome he surveyed—
leaving another 20% unaccounted for.90
It can take a very long time to determine if off-target events have
occurred over multi-generations if the germ line is affected. So, although
Lana (our hypothetical twin)91 may never contract HIV, she may still bear
a child with a different and laboratory-created genetic disease. But we will
not know for sure until her child is born, and even perhaps sometime
afterward.

83. See Brokowski, supra note 6, at 122 (quoting National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”) Director Francis Collins, who is staunchly opposed to germ line editing in any
form and who “cite[d] as problematic ‘unquantifiable safety issues, ethical issues presented
by altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their consent, and
a current lack of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in
embryos’”).
84. PLOMIN, supra note 82, at 70, 116–17, 133.
85. ROBERT C. KING ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 342 (Oxford Univ. Press, 7th
ed. 2006).
86. CRISPR 101: Your Guide to Understanding Crispr, supra note 76 (explaining that
CRISPR utilizes a precisely constructed slice of gRNA which guides an excision enzyme,
the CAS protein, to the specific DNA targeted for modification. Once the CAS protein gets
to the right place, it recognizes the DNA targeted for excision by identifying a spacer motif
downstream from the target. After the DNA is transfected, the efficiency of the operation
is assessed by subjecting the newly transcribed genome to software analysis).
87. Munné, supra note 48, at 395 (noting that regarding “editing via CRISPR, it
remains to be seen if off-target effects are present,” although reports are proliferating of a
host of off-target effects, both positive and negative).
88. Id; see also PLOMIN, supra note 82, at 70, 116–17, 133.
89. A maverick researcher claims to have created GM children, ECONOMIST (Dec. 1,
2018), https://econ.st/2E1imfT.
90. Id.
91. See supra Part I.
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III. THE WRONGFUL RAP ON WRONGFUL LIFE
A.

The Legal Lacuna

Some two-score cases have been brought for WGM in the United
States mostly against sperm banks. Except in the rare case,92 the child’s
claims for wrongful life have been rejected outright, some not even
brought, as a successful pursuit of the claim is considered unattainable.93
1.

Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth—What is the
Difference?

Lawsuits seeking recovery for damages accruing pre-birth94 include
tort claims95 for wrongful life96 and wrongful birth.97 Strictly speaking,
wrongful life is the child’s claim for being born with a disease or
disability.98 Parents seeking damages (for, inter alia, cost of childrearing99 or extra care) bring wrongful birth cases.100 An additional claim,
92. See, e.g., Wuth ex rel. Kessler v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 855 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2015) (allowing special damages for “‘extraordinary expenses for medical care
and special training,’ which are calculable with certainty, [and] . . . recoverable by a child
claiming wrongful life” (quoting Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash.
1983) (en banc))).
93. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 26–27, 36–43.
94. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully
Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R. 3d 15 (1978).
95. See Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1077–79 (Nev. 1986) (suggesting these
claims could be brought as breach of contract); see generally ARB v. IVF Hammersmith
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 2803 (appeal taken from QB) (Eng.), available at
https://bit.ly/35bqYdM (denying a claim for wrongful life/birth that was brought under a
U.K. contract theory); Alexandra Elizabeth Kilduff, The Birth of a Tort Liability Theory?
Legal Remedies for Families of Children Who Inherit Genetic Diseases from Gamete
Donors (May 1, 2014) (unpublished student paper) (on file with Seton Hall Law), available
at https://bit.ly/2KXD6rv (discussing remedies for children born with genetic diseases as
a result of WGM).
96. Quinn v. Blau, No. CV96325691S, 1997 WL 781874, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1997) (“‘Wrongful life’ generally refers to actions brought on behalf of children, as
distinguished from ‘wrongful birth,’ which generally refers to actions brought by
parents.”).
97. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); see also James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872,
879 (W. Va. 1985); Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 3–4, 14, 32.
98. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (allowing a
modified—restricted—wrongful life claim); see also Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of
Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 189
(1993); Strasser, supra note 9, at 44–45.
99. Generally, child-raising costs are limited to parents with children born with a
disability, although in the U.S. a handful of courts have allowed it for healthy children as
well. Outside the U.S., Australia and South Africa allow child-rearing for healthy children,
as apparently does the Netherlands. See Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 5–23.
100. See Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 3–4, 14, 32; see also Wrongful Birth,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933); Wrongful Life, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d
ed. 1933).
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wrongful conception, refines the category and refers to the parents’ “lost
chance” to avoid birthing a healthy child101 (e.g., when the physician fails
to properly perform a sterilization procedure depriving parents of the right
to abortion).102 A fourth cause of action, called dissatisfied life, has been
brought by healthy but illegitimate children who allege injury by virtue of
their illegitimacy.103 Other legal variants and definitions also exist,104 and
courts (and the press)105 routinely commingle terms.106
In fact, wrongful life has been characterized as one of the most
controversial pregnancy-related torts.107 Even the conception (pun
intended) of the phrases wrongful life and wrongful birth has generated
confusion.108 Hence, we find “the tort of wrongful life means different
things to different courts,”109 while “[t]he term wrongful life has attracted
significant criticism.”110 This situation bespeaks a problem with
conceptualization of the claim itself. As the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts stated,111 the labels of wrongful life and wrongful birth “are
not instructive.”112 In cases against sperm banks, some courts have used

101. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810–11 (N.Y. 1978) (defining
“wrongful conception” as a claim for an unsuccessful surgical birth control procedure
resulting in the birth of an unplanned, but healthy child, whereas a “wrongful birth”
includes a child’s claim for illegitimacy); see also Richard E. Wolff, Wrongful Life: A
Modern Claim Which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 125 (1978) (discussing claims based on illegitimacy).
102. Thomas DeWitt Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical
Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REV. 713, 718–19
(1982).
103. See, e.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
104. See, e.g., Ralph R. Frasca, Negligent Beginnings: Damages in Wrongful
Conception, Wrongful Birth and See also Wrongful Life, 19 J. FORENSIC ECON. 185, 185–
86, 190 (2006) (referring to the tort as “wrongful pregnancy,” explaining that “wrongful
birth” pertains to birthing an unhealthy child, explaining that “wrongful conception”
applies to the birth of any unplanned child, and explaining that “wrongful pregnancy”
refers to birthing (or denial of the right to abort) a healthy child); Billauer, Re-Birthing,
supra note 14, at 7–8.
105. See, e.g., Rosalind English, Damages for wrongful life refused, UK HUM. RTS.
BLOG (Jan. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/2nn7tyD.
106. Moscatello ex rel. Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 776 A.2d
874, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (recognizing a factual basis for a wrongful life
claim where a mother relied on a doctor’s statement that she was not at risk to bear
genetically disabled children and carried her pregnancy to term).
107. Strasser, supra note 9, at 29.
108. Rogers, supra note 102, at 715.
109. Kilduff, supra note 95, at 30.
110. CHICO, supra note 61, at 74 (citing JOHN KENYON MASON, THE TROUBLED
PREGNANCY: LEGAL WRONGS AND RIGHTS IN REPRODUCTION 7 (MARGARET BRAZIER &
GRAEME LAURIE EDS., 2007)).
111. Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d. 8, 9–10 & n.3 (Mass. 1990).
112. Id.
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wrongful life language to describe the parent’s wrongful birth claim.113
Other courts have limited wrongful life claims to situations arising out of
physician negligence,114 which should exclude its applicability in sperm
bank cases, but doesn’t. Negligent performance of PGT has been classified
as wrongful conception in some states and wrongful birth in others.115 For
the sake of clarity, I (like others) use wrongful birth as the umbrella claim
for actions brought by a parent, and wrongful life116 to refer to claims
brought by children with disease or disability or at an increased risk
thereof.117

113. See Final Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Collins v. Xytex
Corp., No. 2015-CV-259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Oct. 20, 2015) (noting
that the mother’s claim “most closely . . . fits a claim for wrongful birth – and so is not
allowed. The reason for this is . . . [that] courts are ‘unwillling to say that life, even life
with severe impairments, may ever amount to a legal injury’”); Complaint for Damages,
Norman v. Xytex, No. 2017CV298536 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 30, 2017), available at
https://bit.ly/2Qhc01l.
114. See Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 303 (Va. 1986) (discussing a wrongfully
performed abortion case wherein the court noted that “[s]ome confusion has existed in the
terminology . . . involving actions in which negligence is alleged to have resulted in the
birth of a child. . . . A wrongful birth action is brought by parents on their own behalf,
seeking damages resulting from the birth of a defective child after a failed abortion or the
failure of a physician to advise the parents of risk of genetic or birth defects and thereby
allow an informed decision as to termination of the pregnancy. A wrongful life action is a
similar action brought by or on behalf of the defective child for the physician’s failure to
warn of potential defects or failure to prevent or terminate the pregnancy in light of known
risks. Most courts have rejected this theory that the life of the defective child is worth less
than the child’s nonexistence” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).
115. Mahoney, supra note 55, at 776 (noting that North Carolina and Minnesota treat
negligent preconception genetic testing as wrongful conception; Colorado and Washington
categorize genetic testing negligence as wrongful birth, while Indiana and Nevada treat
such actions as ordinary malpractice).
116. Marten A. Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 85, 85 (1980) (“The only distinctions between the two
actions concern who may bring the actions, and the subsequent success of the actions.”);
see also Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1988) (arising when
an albino child was born after a failed sterilization procedure, damages were sought by
both parents seeking wrongful birth damages, and by the child claiming wrongful life. The
parents’ claim was allowed; the child’s was not—although it was rejected not on “sanctity
of life” grounds but on lack of foreseeability of the child’s injury).
117. See Strasser, supra note 9, at 30; see also Yakren, supra note 24, at 587
(discussing the emotional strain of bringing a wrongful birth claim. Yarken echoes
Professor Fox’s approach [noted earlier] by “broadening the analysis of emotional distress
to reflect and legitimize mothers’ paradoxical feelings about their children [and] reframing
the harm to mothers as loss of reproductive choice rather than as the birth of a flawed child
[thereby] . . . expanding available economic damages to include plaintiff-mothers’
unexpected childcare responsibilities”).

454

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

Simply stated (perhaps overly so), wrongful birth claims are
generally allowed,118 while wrongful life claims are not.119 Generally, the
child’s wrongful life claim is dismissed as an anathema on morality
grounds120 in many countries around the world121 and in most states in the
United States. Three states in the United States do explicitly recognize the
claim: California,122 New Jersey,123 and Washington,124 although
118. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (denying the child’s wrongful
life claim but allowing the parent’s claim for emotional damages under the rubric of
wrongful birth). As of 2006, 42 jurisdictions provided for these types of suits, with only
Nevada affirmatively predisposed to oppose them. See Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d
409, 415–16 (R.I. 1997) (Bourcier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see
Norman v. Xytex, 830 S.E.2d 267, 269 & n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Atlanta Obstetrics
& Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 559 (1990)) (declining to recognize
wrongful birth cases in Georgia, but excepting wrongful conception cases from that
determination).
119. See, e.g., Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1104–05 (Md. 2002) (discussing a
case where the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant failed to properly advise them of blood
test results indicating a heightened possibility that the child might be afflicted with Down’s
Syndrome. The child sought damages for “‘wrongful life’ . . .based on the premise that
being born and having to live with the affliction is a disadvantage, and thus a cognizable
injury, when compared with the alternative of not having been born at all—[and] that an
impaired existence is worse than nonexistence . . . .”); see also Michelle McEntire,
Compensating Post-Conception Prenatal Medical Malpractice While Respecting Life: A
Recommendation to North Carolina Legislators, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 761, 770 & n.66
(2007).
120. See infra Section III.B.2.a.
121. See, e.g., Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, c. 28, § 2(b) (Eng.);
McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] 1 QB 1166 at 1177–78 (Eng.); Harvey Teff,
The Action for “Wrongful Life” in England and the United States, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
423, 426 n.23 (1985). Some claim the McKay court misinterpreted the law. See Anthony
Jackson, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: The English Conception, 17. J. LEGAL MED.
349, 366 (1996).
122. The first decision to allow wrongful life arose in Curlender v. Bio-Science
Labs., where the California Court of Appeals held that:
The reality of the “wrongful-life” concept is that such a plaintiff both exists and
suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat
into meditation on the mysteries of life. We need not be concerned with the fact
that had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into
existence at all. The certainty of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery. In
addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff,
however impaired she may be, has come into existence as a living person with
certain rights.
165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), disapproved by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d
954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (limiting the holding to special damages for the
extraordinary expenses).
123. See Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (citing
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14–15 (N.J. 1979)) abrogating Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227
A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967); see also Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984)
(holding that “a child or his parents may recover special damages for extraordinary medical
expenses incurred during infancy, and that the infant may recover those expenses during
his majority”).
124. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983) (en banc);
see also Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (“In
recognizing a wrongful life claim, this court reasoned that it would be anomalous to permit
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Minnesota also allows wrongful life in certain circumstances. 125 These
international and intranational disparate resolutions raise questions
regarding the legitimacy of different holdings based on differing views of
morality.126
The importance of the wrongful life claim is that it incorporates the
child’s life-long damages for pain, suffering, fear, and related emotional
angst, along with economic loss—claims which together typically
generate higher awards. These higher awards often have a deterrent effect
on the objectionable conduct of a defendant—especially in conjunction
with claims for punitive damages.127 By comparison, the parents’ wrongful
birth claim (especially as currently circumscribed) has little if any “teeth”
in that these claims are generally limited to peri-pregnancy damages and,
in the rare case, emotional harm incident to the pregnancy.128
Attempts to re-configure the tort have also failed. Couching the
wrongful life claim as a product liability claim fails to recognize that
product liability actions also require a damage component, and it is the
damage aspect of the claim that courts find wanting. The court in Donovan
v. Idant Laboratories made this precept abundantly clear. 129 Some legal
commentators claim that predicating the analysis on damages “puts the
cart before the horse and allows the difficulties of [damage] assessment to

recovery by parents alone.”); Wuth ex rel. Kesser v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 846
(Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (resulting in a 50 million dollar award as a result of a doctor’s failure
to diagnose chromosomal translocation in IVF embryos for both the child’s wrongful life
and the parent’s wrongful birth claim).
125. See Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 722–23 (Minn. 2004) (explaining that
claims for wrongful life were allowed when the negligence caused the parents to conceive
a sick child, distinguishing it from negligence claims which prevents parents from suing to
abort a child).
126. See JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 185–87 (4th
ed. 2018) (noting that California, New Jersey, and Washington’s recovery is limited to
recompense only for the special damages occasioned by the disability, and that 23 states
have approved of wrongful birth either by virtue of case law or legislation).
127. See Zenon Zabinski & Bernard S. Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort
Law: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Reform at 27–28. (Nw. Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 13-09), https://bit.ly/2SSvsn7 (finding that patient safety worsens after cap
adoption limits on recovery). See generally Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968) (noting the
deterrence effect of high-level punitive damages).
128. Child-raising costs have also been allowed for children born with a disability,
and a few courts have allowed it for healthy children as well. See Billauer, Re-Birthing,
supra note 14, at 3.
129. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 25; see also Donovan v. Idant Labs.,
625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 374 F. App’x 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
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determine the existence of a right of action.”130 This may be a more cogent
line of analysis, perhaps, but one which still does not provide a solution.131
Bifurcating the claims of parent and child into two discrete categories
further compounds the problem. Courts recognize that the parents’
wrongful birth claim essentially arises as a result of medical malpractice
(e.g., failure to properly sterilize, abort, or inform)132 and causes two
different (and mutually exclusive) types of damage, i.e., birthing a
healthy,133 but unwanted child, and birthing a child with a disease or
disability. The child’s wrongful life claim, however, bundles all manner of
causal scenarios, lumping together different harms (e.g., being born
illegitimate, being born diseased or disabled, and being born with an
increased risk of disease). These different harms arise from different
causes. In some cases, they arise indirectly, such as when the physician
fails to counsel the parents that the child suffers a genetic defect. In other
cases, a technician might directly cause the genetic defect, perhaps during
the biopsy in a PGT procedure. In still other cases, the IVF technician
might indirectly harm the resultant child by implanting the wrong sperm
or embryo in an IVF facility. In the case of CRISPR-Cas, the embryologist
might directly cause the damage via the negligent selection of genes to be
altered or faulty DNA editing.

130. See Jane E. S. Fortin, Is the “Wrongful Life” Action Really Dead?, 9 J. SOC.
WELFARE L. 306, 310 (1987); see also Bernard Dickens, Wrongful Birth and Life, Wrongful
Death Before Birth, and Wrongful Law, in LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN REPRODUCTION 80–86
(Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1989); Julie F. Kowitz, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform:
Statutes Barring Claims for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth are Unconstitutional Under
the Purpose Prong of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 255 (1995);
Paul H. Mitrovich, Ohio Wrongful Pregnancy, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Life Law
Needs to be Revisited to Obtain a More Equitable Result and Consistency of Law, 33 OHIO
NORTHERN U. L. REV. 623, 637 (2007); Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful
Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. REV. 327, 341–42 (2004).
131. Paradoxically, even though denying the cause of action, the court in Bruggeman
v. Schimke refused to consider the damage aspect as the defining element of the claim. See
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642–43 (Kan. 1986) (“Damages do not create a
right or cause of action. The ‘cause of action’ is the wrong done, not the measure of
compensation for it.” (quoting Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., 662 P.2d 1214, 1226
(Kan. 1983))).
132. See David D. Wilmoth, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action –
Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 611, 612 (1980) (citations
omitted) (“There are two basic varieties of wrongful life actions. The first involves a child
born out of wedlock who claims another’s tortious conduct caused him to be born and
suffer the stigma of illegitimacy. The second, and more common type of wrongful life
action, is brought by or on behalf of a physically or mentally impaired child against a
physician whose alleged negligence caused the child’s birth.”).
133. In Slawek v. Stroh, the infant-plaintiff was born a normal child, although
illegitimate. She sued her putative father for embarrassment, humiliation, and the lack of
social standing she would endure—and lost. See Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 21–22
(Wis. 1974) (refusing to recognize as enforceable a cause of action for wrongful birth or
wrongful life).

2020

WRONGFUL LIFE IN THE AGE OF CRISPR-CAS

457

This state of affairs enables courts to affix any of the myriad reasons
raised for rejecting the wrongful life claim to situations where it is inapt,134
cementing the status quo barring recovery. Given that recent technology
has generated a host of circumstances not contemplated at the time the
wrongful life doctrine was created in the 1960s135 or in the years over
which it developed136 and its rejection entrenched,137 the time has come to
revisit this situation.
A brief review of the early cases seeking wrongful life for supplying
defective or inappropriate sperm by a sperm bank is instructive. These
cases enable us to understand the impropriety of rejecting the claim in the
context of WGM occasioned by wrongful tampering with gametogenic
material or supplying defective genetic material (sperm, oocytes, or
embryo) to create a child.
The first case seeking recovery for the child’s pain and suffering for
WGM, Johnson v. Superior Court (California Cryobank, Inc.),138 was
brought against a sperm bank. Therein, Brittany Johnson claimed damages
for her Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease allegedly caused
by defective sperm contributed by an anonymous donor. The Johnsons
claimed the sperm bank sold the defective sperm even though the sperm
bank operators knew it came from a donor with a family history of disease.
Notwithstanding the clear failure to disclose and the ostensibly direct
causal connection between the disease and the sperm bank which supplied
sperm, the court ruled the child’s claims constituted wrongful life and
therefore denied the claims.
The second reported case, Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human
Reproduction,139 was brought a year later in New York. Here, the child
was born with cystic fibrosis. Again, the disease was allegedly caused, at
least in part, by an anonymous supplier—in this case, an egg donor who
134. See Mark E. Cohen, Note, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing Judicial
Development of the Theory of “Wrongful Life,” 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 211, 215–17 (1978)
(referring to a situation where the child sues a doctor seeking redress for its being alive—
not for damages incident to being living, albeit in a compromised fashion caused by a sperm
bank or medical researcher).
135. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691–92 (N.J. 1967), abrogated
by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (“In light of changes in the law which have
occurred in the 12 years since Gleitman was decided, the second ground relied upon by the
Gleitman majority can no longer stand in the way of judicial recognition of a cause of
action founded upon wrongful birth.”).
136. See, e.g., James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985).
137. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 538, 540–41 (D.S.C. 1980)
(denying a child’s wrongful life claim where the defendants failed to advise his mother of
a Down’s Syndrome diagnosis, the court noting that “[t]he overwhelming majority of those
cases have refused to recognize the validity of ‘wrongful life’ claims”).
138. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
abrogated on other grounds 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
139. Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641–42 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2003).
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carried the gene for the disease. Again, this fact was apparently known to
the Reproduction Center, but was not disclosed.140 Neither was the father
tested for the disease, a critical factor, since both parents must be carriers
for the disease to manifest in the offspring. Again, the court determined
the child did not have the right to sue for wrongful life because such a case
would grant the IVF child rights not possessed by naturally born
children.141
The third case, Donovan v. Idant Laboratories,142 was also
occasioned by an allegedly defective gene supplied from an anonymous
sperm supplier which the sperm bank took pains to hide.143 Here, the child,
also named Brittany, was born with the genetically-transmitted Fragile X
syndrome. In fact, Brittany Donovan’s Fragile X syndrome was apparently
proven to be due to the genetic input of the sperm supplier. Nonetheless,
the court ruled the damages sounded in wrongful life which was not
recognized.144
Because the claims were denied in all three cases, the precise facts
resulting in providing the purportedly defective gametes cannot be
ascertained. In Johnson, the logical assumption is that the sperm bank was
not careful in its recordkeeping or accepted inappropriate donors. In
Paretta, while there is no evidence, it may be possible the facility assumed
that because active cystic fibrosis can only be transmitted if both parents
have the gene, the center could take the risk the father was not a carrier,
and “get away” with supplying defective gametes (in this case, oocytes)
for a “hidden” genetic disorder. The sequence of events leading to Brittany
Donovan’s Fragile X cannot be apprehended. Possibly, it is due to failure
to screen and test the donor; it is equally possible the gene was damaged
during the IVF procedure itself. We will never know.

140. Id. Similar cases which did not result in suit exist, suggesting there may be many
more such cases of which the legal community is unaware. See Billauer, Sperminator,
supra note 13, at 35.
141. See Yaniv Heled, Comment, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated
Reproductive Tissue—The Need for Federal Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
243, 265–66 (2010) (citing Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 643–48) (noting that the court left
some claims open and allowed the case to proceed. Because of this determination coupled
with fear of punitive damages, the case settled for a whopping 1.3 million dollars).
142. See Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 271 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d,
374 F. App’x 319 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372,
375–76 (Wis. 1975). See generally Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
143. See Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 267–68 (holding the delay in making the causal
connection between the sperm and the child’s disease cost the mother her wrongful birth
suit which became time-barred); see also Martha Henriques, Sperm bank warns against
tracing anonymous donor via DNA test, BIONEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://bit.ly/39vdWeh
(discussing the use of commercial databases to establish paternity and the fact that, at least
one sperm bank warned parents not to do this. Northwest Cryobank reportedly warned a
parent whose child underwent DNA testing against contacting the donor or his relatives).
144. Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 271, 275–76.
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A full defense of these claims, had they been allowed to survive,
would have seen the defendant facilities laying bare their laboratory
protocols or prudent practice procedures—or proving the disease occurred
through events outside their control or under the control of others. From a
public health standpoint, the more we learn about the causes of IVF or
PGT errors, whether from negligence or not, the better we can implement
safeguards to prevent future problems. The impetus to crash the judicial
barricade on wrongful life claims for WGM, therefore, becomes
imperative.
2.

Untangling the Scenarios Birthing the Legal Claims

To understand why wrongful life claims are rejected, I first identify
circumstances “giving birth” to the claim. I then untangle the different
legal rationales rejecting its use. Unraveling the factual and legal matrices
demonstrates that the objections do not correlate with cases where children
are born diseased or disabled as a result of modern technology or WGM,
as opposed to the physician malpractice of the earlier cases.
As we have seen, the multiplicity of legal claims associated with
reproductive harm reflects the multiple scenarios generating them, as well
as the different outcomes. Historically, wrongful birth145 (and life)146
claims arose when a parent would have preferred to abort a child during
pregnancy,147 a first category or level of harm. In some such cases, the
parents were advised that the fetus was sound when anomalies resulting in
serious illness/or disease were not detected in time to abort.148 In a second
category of harm, parents were simply not advised to seek testing when
parental medical history would have so indicated.149 In a third type of case,
the parents simply decided they did not want a child, and their wishes were
frustrated due to physician negligence.150 This type of reproductive wrong
includes failed sterilization or faulty abortion where an unwanted (but
healthy) child was born.151 Regardless, all cases in this category involve a
physician’s negligence.152 In most cases, the parent’s claims are
recognized,153 but damages may be circumscribed if the child is born
145. See Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 9–10.
146. The third reported wrongful life case is Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692.
147. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 540 n.5 (D.S.C. 1980).
148. See, e.g., Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 346–48 (Nev. 1995).
149. See Phillips, 508 F. Supp. at 538–40 (discussing birthing a child with Down’s
Syndrome).
150. See, e.g., Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 410–11 (R.I. 1997).
151. See id. at 410–14.
152. See id. at 411.
153. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (overruling Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967)). The Berman court allowed the mother’s wrongful
birth claim against a physician for failing to recommend amniocentesis which would have
detected the child’s Down’s Syndrome and allowed damages for peri-pregnancy-related
claims (claims triggered during pregnancy) including emotional distress, as well as medical
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healthy.154 As stated earlier, in virtually all cases the child’s wrongful life
claim was denied.155
A second category of reproductive harm also involves pre-birth
physician malpractice, here where a physician negligently performs
surgery in utero to correct a congenital abnormality, and either causes
harm or fails to correct the deformity. As in the first two of the situations
described above, the harm may not be caused by the physician, but rather
is not remedied or alleviated by the doctor. This category differs from the
one above only because here the child would be able to recover. The
reasoning for the disparity can only be understood by referring to the
philosophical realm and Parfit’s NIP, discussed in Part IV.
In a third category of harm, negligence again occurs pre-birth and
results in a child born with harm, disease, disability, or heightened risk
thereof. This category, however, does not involve physician malpractice
and has a more proximate relationship between act and consequence. This
category manifests in three guises: (1) when embryos156 or gametes157 are
switched or wrongfully implanted;158 (2) when the embryo is fertilized
with sperm (or oocytes) from a genetically compromised supplier
(donor)159 because of poor screening160 or poor testing procedures;161and
(3) when the wrong embryo is selected after PGT.162 In the first situation,
and other costs the parents would incur in raising, educating, and supervising the child. Id.
at 15.
154. See, e.g., Emerson, 689 A.2d at 415–16 (Bourcier, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
155. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808–11, 814 (N.Y. 1978).
156. See, e.g., Perry-Rogers v. Fasano, 715 N.Y.S.2d 19, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
157. See generally ACB v. Thomson Medical Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGCA 20
(Sing.) (creating a new cause of action called “loss of genetic affinity,” where the potential
father’s sperm was switched, and the parents were denied the opportunity to jointly parent
child biologically related to both of them).
158. See, e.g., Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (concerning
switched sperm at an IVF facility resulting in the birth of an interracial child). The court in
Andrews denied recovery in an action brought for medical malpractice. Id. at 365. The case
differs from ACB v. Thomson in that the aggrieved party here was not the putative
biological parent, and the damage was simply a different ethnicity from that of the putative
father, rather than substitution of a different genetic package altogether. See ACB v.
Thomson Medical Pte Ltd and others [2017] SGCA 20 (Sing.).
159. See, e.g., Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
160. See Final Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Collins v. Xytex
Corp., No. 2015-CV-259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Oct. 20, 2015); see also
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Norman v. Xytex Corp., No. 2017-CV-298536
(Ga. Super. Ct. June 13, 2018), available at https://bit.ly/2toClSe.
161. See, e.g., Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641–
42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
162. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 303, 318, 320
n.124 (2008); see also IVF: Second Couple Sue After Clinic “Uses Wrong Embryos,” BBC
NEWS (July 11, 2019), https://bbc.in/2MVvSVM. For background on PGT, see Baruch et
al., supra note 60, at 667.
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the child may be born without physical harm—the damage to the child
would be the trauma of a custody battle or being of a different racial mix
than its parents. In the remaining situations, the child is born with a disease
(usually an inherited one)163 or an increased risk of disease.164 The Xytex
suite of cases, of which I have previously written at length,165 is
illustrative. In that scenario, at least 26 women were shocked to learn their
36 children were sired by a man, Donor 9623, who had a history of
criminal incarceration and a severe and possibly hereditary mental illness,
in this case, schizophrenia.166 This latter feature could subject the
individual offspring to an increased risk of developing the disease if the
father’s disease is the heritable form, and if so, conferring a high likelihood
that four children of the 36 children born of Donor 9623 sperm would, in
fact, suffer the disease (compared to a background level of none or one).167
This is but one example of the WGM class of harm where the
wrongfulness is supplying improperly selected genetic material for the
purpose of creating an embryo.168
A variant of the above-designed WGM occurs in the case of PGT,
where the parent deliberately selects a genetic signature for the child, one
which society calls an impairment, e.g., deafness.169 Although the
selection may be done by a parent (who is sui generis by virtue of parental
immunity), the “actor” who constructs, selects, and implants the embryo,
is a member of the medical profession. Nevertheless, the child would be
barred from suit. The reasoning might include traditional rationale such as
lack of duty on the part of the physician. Alternatively, the conventional
rationale for rejecting the wrongful life claim is premised on the assertion
that this particular child would not have been born at all, had the child not
been born deaf.170 Thus, because the parents would not have selected this
embryo for implantation had it not carried the gene for deafness, that child
owes its existence to its disability. In other words, this particular child
would not have been born, had it not been deaf, because the parents would

163. See, e.g., Donovan, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 262–63.
164. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
165. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 35–42.
166. Schizophrenia is heritable in some 50–80% of cases. Id. at 38, 43–47. In the
Xytex situation we do not know if Mr. Aggeles’s condition was of the non-transmissible or
heritable variety. Family history is not determinative, in that a heritable mutation may
affect an individual without it previously occurring in his lineage.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)
(explaining that although the court “recognized the ‘very nearly uniform high value’ which
the law and mankind have placed upon human life . . . it cannot be said, as a matter of
public policy, that the birth of a healthy child constitutes a harm cognizable at law” (quoting
O’Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1985))).
169. See Smolensky, supra note 162, at 299, 303, 318, 320 & n.124.
170. Id. at 304–05.
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not have selected him or her for implantation. Here, we would have a
distinct conflict between parental choice and the child’s rights.171
We have a third variant of WGM, where actual damages are caused
during the course of PGT. Here, either an error is made and a defective
embryo which should have been discarded is mistakenly implanted, or
damage is caused to the genome itself during the PGT biopsy or the IVF
procedure.
Finally, we have a fourth variant of WGM: the case of active genetic
tampering. For now, this is mostly available only at the clinical-testing or
rogue investigator-researcher level. But active genetic engineering no
longer lies in the theoretical realm, and we must now grapple with harm
resulting from human-designed embryos, à la He Jiankui. The question of
whether parents have a right to design their child-of-choice is an ethical
and moral one outside the scope of this Article. However, the question of
what happens if the procedure is done improperly or goes wrong and
produces a child with defects or disabilities is a legal one.
This Article addresses the legal lacuna faced by the child harmed as
a result of WGM, be it via IVF, PGT, parental choice, or gene-editing. In
denying those children redress, courts ransack the holdings of cases which
I claim are irrelevant, applying their reasoning robotically to cases that are
outside the factual purview giving rise to the opinion. I thus continue the
inquiry by identifying the approaches used to reject the child’s wrongful
life claim. Before so doing, the first level of inquiry is to note that cases
giving rise to rejecting that claim stem from physician malpractice and
generally pertain to an ultimate remedy of abortion sought by the parents.
After cementing this fact, I investigate the hydra-headed approach courts
use to reject wrongful life. The first is a public policy approach that
contains four discrete and distinct sub-arguments.172 The second approach
impleads the philosophical doctrine of Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity
Problem, which essentially is a standing argument, and is discussed in Part
IV. In Part V, I begin to assemble a solution.

171. While disability rights groups champion such activity, would they sound in the
same way in the case of parents selecting an embryo purely for the sake of being a spare
organ or tissue repository for themselves or other siblings? At present the practice for
creation of immuno-compatible siblings who, themselves, are not at risk of developing
genetic disease is, under certain circumstances, legitimate in the U.K. See CHICO, supra
note 61, at 9–10. For further reading; see generally JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER
(2004), a fictional story based on a true-life incident where parents birthed a child for the
purposes of creating a genetically compatible tissue source.
172. The flaws of using public policy considerations in this context are set forth in
Lam’s comprehensive article. See generally Lam, supra note 21 (discussing the use of
public policy as a basis to support holdings in reproductive negligence decisions in the
context of the loss of the genetic affinity claim espoused by the court in the Singapore case
of ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd. [2017] SGCA 20 (Sing.)).
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Untangling the Bases for Rejecting Wrongful Life
1.

The Who Dunnit Discrepancy

As the court in Emerson v. Magendentz noted, the wrongful life/birth
claim is “nothing more and nothing less than a medical malpractice cause
of action.”173 At least one court noted the term “wrongful” is inapt, as “any
‘wrongfulness’ lies not in the life, the birth, the conception or the
pregnancy, but in the negligence of the physician.”174 The rationale for
rejecting wrongful life claims in cases against a physician,175 where the
argument is the failure to facilitate abortion or prevent pregnancy, are
plainly inapposite where the child is born as a result of WGM. For one
thing, the bad actor in these latter cases is usually not a physician (who has
taken the Hippocratic Oath, “first do no harm”) amenable to malpractice
claims, but rather a profit-generating sperm bank, an ego-driven or
publicity-seeking researcher,176 or a parent with a bias they wish to saddle
on their child. Overall, policy reasons limiting medical malpractice claims
are thus irrelevant, as are concerns over the regard in which the medical
profession is held.177 Thus, we find the opinion in Berman v. Allan,178
noting that “[w]e would be remiss if we did not take judicial notice of the
high esteem which our society accords to those involved in the medical
profession [because] . . . [p]hysicians are the preservers of life,”179 is
clearly inapt in the context of PGT laboratories, profit-mongering IVF
facilities, or any other form of gene-manipulation which is not performed
by health-care physicians.

173. See Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 415–16 (R.I. 1997) (Bourcier, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 304
(Va. 1986)); see also Pollard, supra note 130, at 327 (noting that “[w]rongful life refers to
a negligence claim asserted by a child who suffers from birth defects, . . . resulting from a
physician’s malpractice in failing to inform the mother of potential birth defects, either
preconception or during pregnancy, and consequently, depriving her of the option of
avoiding conception or terminating the pregnancy” (internal citations omitted)).
174. Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 n.3 (Mass. 1990) (emphasis added).
175. See Galvez v. Frields, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50, 57–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that a wrongful life action is “one form of a medical malpractice action” and an “impaired
child may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the
hereditary ailment from which he or she suffers”). A “wrongful life” claim is one “brought
on behalf of a severely defective infant, against a physician, . . . contend(ing) that the
physician negligently failed to inform the child’s parents of the possibility of their bearing
a severely defective child, thereby preventing a parental choice to avoid the child’s birth.”
See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 538 n.1 (D.S.C. 1980) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
176. See Healy, supra note 81.
177. See Pollard, supra note 130, at 327 (“From its inception, wrongful life
jurisprudence has relied on an inaccurate description of tort policy to deny recovery to
children suffering unnecessarily as a direct result of medical malpractice.”).
178. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (N.J. 1979).
179. Id.
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We also have a causation-truncation problem. In cases against
physicians, the doctor may have harmed the mother,180 but generally, there
is no direct causal connection between the physician’s acts and the child’s
harm.181 As the health-economist, Ralph Frasca, noted in cases of
reproductive wrongs occasioned by physician negligence, “[t]he injury,
the birth, is the same in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits.”182 In most
wrongful life claims brought to date, the malpractice results in the birth,
not the defect.183 Thus, as the court noted in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis:
The child does not allege that the physician’s negligence caused the
child’s deformity. Rather, the claim is that the physician’s negligence
[and] his failure to adequately inform the parents of the risk . . . has
caused the birth of the deformed child. The child argues that but for
the inadequate advice, it would not have been born to experience the
pain and suffering attributable to the deformity.184

By comparison, in the case of WGM, the harm suffered by the child
is directly caused by the sperm bank’s defective product, the laboratory’s
negligence, or the researcher’s malfeasance. Another crucial difference in
harms generated as a result of WGM is that the objective of the technology
is to have a child, not to prevent one from being born, the gravamen of
physician- induced wrongful life and birth cases. Thus, “[t]he injury in the
wrongful birth or wrongful life suit is the denial of a choice that would
have resulted in abortion . . . . An abortion is the foregone desired
outcome.”185 And this brings us to the abortion argument, the subject of
the next section.

180. It is not claimed that the defendants failed to do something to prevent or reduce
the ravages of rubella, which was the gravamen of Gleitman v. Cosgrove. 227 A.2d 689,
691 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); see also Greco v.
United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev. 1995) (presenting a similar fact pattern).
181. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 638 (Kan. 1986) (“The child does not
allege that the physician’s negligence caused the child’s deformity. Rather, the claim is
that the physician’’ negligence . . . has caused the birth of the deformed child . . . [and] but
for the inadequate advice, it would not have been born to experience the pain and suffering
attributable to the deformity.” (quoting Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d 384,
392 (Colo. App. 1985))).
182. Frasca, supra note 104, at 195.
183. Id. at 186.
184. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983) (en banc)
(quoting Thomas Keasler Foutz, “Wrongful Life”: The Right Not to Be Born, 54 TUL. L.
REV. 480, 485 (1980)). Nevertheless, even here, the Harbeson court allowed recovery for
the child’s claim. See id. at 497.
185. Frasca, supra note 104, at 195. The argument that but for the action, the child
would not have been born cannot be countenanced, as there is an affirmative obligation
that s/he who even gratuitously assumes a duty has an obligation to perform it in a nonnegligent fashion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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The Public Policy Argument: Any Life is Better Than None

The seminal case rejecting wrongful life is Becker v. Schwartz,186
although it was not the first such case to do so. In 1975, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin reached the same result,187 as did the New Jersey court in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove in 1967.188 Muddling together a bunch of reasons
for their decision, the Becker decision, addressing a malpractice suit
against a physician for failing to disclose genetic risks,189 rejected the
claim by couching it in public policy terms.190 We are not specifically told
which public policy was involved, but when parsed out, the argument has
distinct moralistic tendencies that subsume four discrete perspectives
lumped together. These are: (1) that abortion is an anathema; (2) that a
supreme reverence for the “sanctity of life” governs;191 (3) the fear of
trespassing on the philosophical inquiry regarding the mysteries of life
versus non-life and quantification of damages precludes the claim;192 and
(4) that no child has a claim for a right to be free from genetic defects.193
a.

The Ghost of Abortion

The harm parents allege here is a violation of the parental right to
terminate the pregnancy—i.e., the right not to have the child, or the denial
of their right to abortion. Illustrating the bleeding impact of abortionrepugnance which infects the child’s claim for damages, we have the
British case of McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority.194 Therein, the
186. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 813 (N.Y. 1978) (sustaining the
mother’s wrongful birth claim for failing to advise her to be tested during pregnancy,
thereby denying her the right to abort a child born with Down’s Syndrome—minus claims
for emotional distress—but denying the mother’s claim for wrongful life).
187. See Dumer v. St. Michael’s Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 375–76 (Wis. 1975)
(rejecting the child’s claim for wrongful life in a medical malpractice action for failure to
diagnose her mother’s rubella during her pregnancy).
188. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692–93 (N.J. 1967) abrogated by
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). Of course, when Gleitman was decided abortion
was not yet legalized. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
189. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810.
190. Id. (“Any such resolution, whatever it may be, must invariably be colored by
notions of public policy . . . .”). This is also true in the United Kingdom, where public
policy barred granting damages for the birth of a healthy child. See McFarlane v. Tayside
Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59 (SC (HL)) (Scot.); Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital
Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, [2003] UKHL 52 (appeal taken from Eng.).
191. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. 1983) (explaining that
many courts demonstrate an “unwillingness to hold that the birth of a normal healthy child
can be judged to be an injury to the parents” because such a notion “offends fundamental
values attached to human life”).
192. See Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 1981).
193. See Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F.Supp.2d 256, 275 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 374
F. App’x 319 (3d Cir. 2010).
194. McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 at 1173, 1185 (Eng.)
(holding the only duty to the child was not to directly injure it, in a case where the parents
were denied proper genetic counseling).

466

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 124:2

court noted that although the doctor owed a duty to inform the mother of
the desirability of abortion, the application of such duty to the child would
not be countenanced. “Such a duty [the court held] was contrary to public
policy because it would ‘put doctors under a subconscious pressure to
advise abortion in doubtful cases.’”195 Judges have used this rationale to
reject the child’s wrongful life claim, all the while—incomprehensively—
parents are allowed to present their wrongful birth claim.196 This illogical
leap might account for decisions opining that “the danger that doctors
would be under subconscious pressures to advise abortion in doubtful
cases through fear of an action for damages, is, we think, a real one,”197 or
“if [wrongful life] actions were allowed, a doctor would be obliged to urge
a woman to have an abortion if there was the slightest chance that her child
would be born defective,”198 resulting in rejection of wrongful life
claims.199
In case there is yet any doubt of the potency of the anti-abortion
sentiment driving these cases, one commentator made it patently clear:
Make no mistake. These cases are not about birth, or wrongfulness, or
negligence, or common law. They are about abortion . . . . For those
who cannot accept the premise [that abortion is a legal choice for a
woman, they claim that], no one should ever be compensated for injury
just because the choice of abortion has been thwarted. 200

To be sure, these anti-abortion sentiments have generated outrage, and
some judges have castigated the fear-mongering involved:201
Recognition of a cause of action for the negligent performance of
lawful medical procedures certainly will not encourage or promote
sterilization or abortion. Any reference in this context to the salutary

195. See CHICO, supra note 61, at 75, 185; see also Athena N. C. Liu, Wrongful life:
some of the problems, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 69, 70 (1987).
196. See Speck, 439 A.2d at 113–16.
197. McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 at 1187 (Eng.).
198. Robert Lee, To Be or Not to Be: Is That the Question? The Claim of Wrongful
Life, in BIRTHRIGHTS: LAW AND ETHICS AT THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE 172, 185 (Robert Lee
& Derek Morgan eds., 1989) (alteration in original).
199. McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166,1187 (Eng.).
200. Carol Sanger, The Lopsided Harms of Reproductive Negligence, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 29, 45 (2017) (alteration in original) (citing Schloss v. Miriam Hosp., No.
C.A. 98-2076, 1999 WL 41875, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1999)).
201. Lee, supra note 198, at 185 (“[T]his seems a particularly sinister form of the
defensive medicine argument, since it asserts that doctors will respond to wrongful life
actions by acting unlawfully. There is no other way to describe actions such as ‘urging’
abortion or advising it . . . . Not to allow compensation to A, on the basis that it might cause
B to engage in unlawful activity at the expense of C, is a form of moral blackmail which
the judiciary would decry in many other contexts. If uttered by any other critic, this type
of allegation concerning the likely behaviour of doctors would be met by resentful
indignation on the part of the medical establishment.”).
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public policy . . . favoring childbirth over abortion is nothing more than
a red herring.202

Indeed, some courts hold that if abortion is a right, but not one for
which a plaintiff could seek redress for negligence performance, “that right
would be hollow indeed.”203 But these are minority opinions which have
yet to gain traction. A reciprocal perspective with the same outcome
results from arguing the converse premise, not against abortion per se, but
in favor of a public policy favoring birth.204 This line of reasoning has been
rejected as contradicting Roe v. Wade.205 Nevertheless, it is a prevailing
undercurrent.
Decisions denying wrongful life claims arise under the specter that an
increase in abortion would be the (horrible) result.206 Although the
reasoning may be relevant in failed sterilization or abortion cases,207 the
rejection is inapplicable in WGM cases, where the parent actively desires
a child—not an abortion. In these cases, the parent is denied the right to
parent—which includes the right to select a co-parent of choice.208
Unfortunately, the child’s claim has been couched as the right not to be
born, which courts find an anathema (discussed below), rather than as
damages for pain and suffering or the right to have genetic defects
remedied. It is not surprising then, that judges, who we might assume are
evenly divided in their views on abortion, might subconsciously use a
“blessings of children” argument209 to avoid a resolution which would
encourage abortion. With this in mind, let us restate the problem as it
would arise in WGM cases:
The issue is not compensation for an unwanted child with a disability,
but the birth of a wanted child who, as a direct consequence of a negligent
act, has a disability. When such a child sues for wrongful life against a
sperm bank (or a researcher or laboratory), it is not because the parents
wanted to abort that child. In this case, the parents have already taken steps
202. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 118 n.2 (Pa. 1981).
203. Id. at 114.
204. See id. at 114.
205. See id. at 117 (“Whether we personally like it or not, the clear and simple fact is
that the medical procedures . . . sought . . . are perfectly legal in this Commonwealth . . .
[and] the issue here presented is not whether the public policy of Pennsylvania favors birth
over abortion . . . .”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117, 128, 142 n.55. (1973).
206. See Speck, 439 A.2d at 118 n.5. However, today, the choice includes a third
option, genetic surgery, and hence even the typical failure to diagnose or test during
pregnancy does not bring with it the same outcome as previously. Abortion or birthing a
child with a defect are not the only two alternatives anymore. See Sarah DeWeerdt,
Prenatal gene therapy offers the earliest possible cure, NATURE (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://go.nature.com/2Ci05sF.
207. Although this rationale is personally objectionable.
208. Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 65–67.
209. Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 419 (R.I. 1997) (Bourcier, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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to assure, as much as nature can, that their child will be healthy (leaving
aside for the moment the parents who want to create a child with a
disability, such as deafness). The parent, however, did not intend for this
particular child to be born, a child saddled with deficits—not due to an act
of nature—but due to someone’s negligence.210 Nor does the child claim
that s/he would have been better off not being born. All that is sought is
damages for being harmed by the defendant’s malfeasance.
Surely, the rationale offered by Judge Flaherty in Speck v. Finegold211
applies doubly in this context:
[W]hen existence is foreseeably and inextricably coupled with a
disease, such an existence, depending upon the nature of the disease,
may be intolerably burdensome. To judicially foreclose consideration
of whether life in a particular case is such a burden would be to tell the
diseased, possibly deformed plaintiff that he can seek no remedy in the
courts and to imply that his alternative remedy, in the extreme event
that he finds his life unduly burdensome, is suicide.212

The child in the WGM case seeks redress then not for being born, but
for a life with a foreseeable disability or increased risk of a genetic disease.
Hence, where there is no recognized legal remedy and the child finds “his
life unduly burdensome [the alternative is not abortion, but rather], is
suicide.”213 Denying legal redress to that child would indeed be
“unfortunate.”214
To circle back to the public policy aspect of the abortion issue, it is
also worth noting that societal views underpinning public policy change.
Past surveys indicated that about half of the country not long ago believed
abortion was truly abhorrent and morally wrong,215 and courts predicated
210. See generally R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2071
(2017) (noting a case where the plaintiff sought a white sperm donor and was impregnated
with sperm from a black man, subsequently giving birth to a bi-racial child). The Cramblett
case results in the same physical outcome as ACB v. Thomson Med. Pte. Ltd. In the former
case no cause of action was recognized; in the latter, the claim of “loss of genetic affinity”
was created. The difference factually was that in the Thomson case, the father, too, sought
a child with a genetic connection. It must also be noted that the claim for loss of genetic
affinity can be abused when the lawsuit is not predicated on a genetic infirmity but on
selection-criteria gone wrong: girl instead of boy, blue eyes instead of brown, white skin
instead of black. It can be argued, of course, that the parents ordered a particular type of
child, and not getting what they ordered, they should have the right to sue. Interestingly,
should a rare stone or book have been ordered from a catalogue, and the wrong stone or
book is sent, the buyer would be allowed to sue. Why, then, when it comes to the most
precious commodity, children, is this right denied?
211. Speck, 439 A.2d at 115.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, How Religion is Coming to Terms with Modern
Fertility Methods, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://wapo.st/2NxklLS; see also Speck,
439 A.2d at 121 (“It is the faith of some that sterilization is morally wrong, whether to keep
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decisions disallowing wrongful life claims on that basis. As one judge
noted, “I can think of no issue where the residents . . . are more divided
than the question of abortion. Moreover, there is a legislatively expressed
policy favoring childbirth.”216 The judge added, “[c]learly, there is not the
unanimity of opinion in regard to either sterilization or abortion that would
justify embracing a cause of action for ‘wrongful birth’ or ‘wrongful
life.’”217 This opinion, however, was written almost 40 years ago.
But mores are changing. For example, one 2018 report noted that a
statistically significant percentage of Americans (56%) are pro-choice (up
from 51%, not five months earlier).218 As of 2019, that figure increased to
61%,219 while only 38% are pro-life.220 Further, and by comparison, 80%
of Americans view IVF as morally acceptable.221 It would thus behoove
courts going forward to promote the safety of IVF (and all types of WGM),
via a policy favoring deterrence via damages.
b.

“The Sanctity of Life” vs. “The Quality of Life”

An alternative formulation of the abortion anathema presents itself in
the “sanctity of life” argument. This doctrine holds “that the value of
human life always exceeds all other values and that all human life is
equal.”222 The perspective pervades decisions outlawing wrongful life and

(a) wife from having children or for any other reason.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 43 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1958))); Abortion War; LateTerm Abortions, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2019, at 20; The Interminable Abortion War,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2019, at 27, available at https://econ.st/37DGCQq; What explains
Donald Trump’s war on late-term abortions?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2019, at 20, available
at https://econ.st/2QMMDDJ.
216. Speck, 439 A.2d at 121 (Nix, J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. See Cha, supra note 215.
219. See Michael Lipka & John Gramlich, 5 facts about the abortion debate in
America, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2LayWMO; see also Dov Fox,
Abortion, Eugenics and Personhood in the Supreme Court (San Diego Law Sch., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 19-405, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/2QpHz9x.
220. See Lipka & Gramlich, supra note 219 (“About six-in-ten U.S. adults (61%) said
in a 2019 survey that abortion should be legal in all or most cases, compared with 38%
who said it should be illegal all or most of the time.”); see also Most Voters Don’t See a
Threat to Roe v. Wade, RASMUSSEN REP. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://bit.ly/2MqjD20.
221. Cha, supra note 215 (“The Pew Research Center found in 2013 that, while
Americans are divided on the morality of abortion, nearly 80 percent of U.S. adults
consider IVF morally acceptable or not a moral issue – a finding that holds regardless of
gender, political affiliation or religion.”).
222. CHICO, supra note 61, at 76 (noting that although the “sanctity of life” is in
decline, “[courts] refuse . . . to impose a duty of care on public policy grounds on the basis
that it would make an ‘inroad on the sanctity of human life’” as the value of human life
always exceeds all other values). But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that “[u]nconstrained by religious convictions
concerning the sanctity of life, . . . [t]he reality of the ‘wrongful-life’ concept is that such a
plaintiff both exists and suffers” (emphasis omitted)).
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birth claims,223 also under the guise of public policy.224 In this iteration,
the courts recast the child’s claim not as suffering a damaged life, but as
“suffering any life at all,” i.e., “the infant plaintiff [asserts] . . . not that
[she] should have been born without defects but [rather] that [she] should
not have been born at all . . . .”225 As the court in Berman v. Allan noted,
“[o]ne of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life whether
experienced with or without a major physical handicap is more precious
than non-life.”226 Similarly, in Harriton v. Stephens,227 the High Court of
Australia refused to hold that the child’s present life with disabilities
represented a loss that should be recognized as constituting actionable
damages.228 Further, in Azzolino v. Dingfelder,229 the court held that “[w]e
are unwilling to say that life, even life with severe [impairments], may
ever amount to a legal injury.”230
To support rejecting wrongful life on moral grounds predicated on the
“sanctity of life,” one author brought down the quote from Ecclesiastes231
that “anyone who is among the living has hope– [and]even a live dog is
better off than a dead lion.”232 Unfortunately, the author did not delve
deeply enough into Jewish teachings. These writings identify four types of
people who do not have such hope and hence are considered as if dead: a
poor person, a person affected by skin disease ( ְמּצֹ ָרע, metzora), a blind
223. See ABORTION, MEDICINE, & THE LAW 1498–99 (J. DOUGLAS BUTLER & DAVID
F. WALBERT EDS., 6th ed. 2016).
224. See CHICO, supra note 61, at 75–76, 82, 173.
225. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (N.J. 1979) (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967)); see also Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256, 275
(E.D. Pa. 2009).
226. Berman, 404 A.2d at 12 (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 652 & n.1 (N.J.
1976)).
227. Harriton v. Stephens [2006] HCA 15, 98 (Austl.).
228. See CHICO, supra note 61, at 74 n.12 (“We are not told which precise policy is
at issue but [Stephenson LJ] makes specific reference to ‘the sanctity of life.’”); see also
Lee, supra note 198, AT 185.
229. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 534 (N.C. 1985); see also Wilbur v.
Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ark. 1982); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson,
398 S.E.2d 557, 561 (Ga. 1990). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982)
(en banc) (stating that “while our society and our legal system unquestionably place the
highest value on all human life, we do not think that it is accurate to suggest that this state’s
public policy establishes—as a matter of law—that under all circumstances ‘impaired life’
is ‘preferable’ to ‘nonlife’”).
230. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 534; see also Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr.
899, 907–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“It is simply impossible to determine in any rational or
reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born.”);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wa. 1983) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds,
746 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1984).
231. See Francis Sohn, Note, Products Liability and the Fertility Industry:
Overcoming Some Problems in “Wrongful Life,” 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 145, 156 (2011).
232. ECCLESIASTES 9:4. But see 2 TALMUD BAVLI: NEDARIM § 64b (Yisroel Simcha
Schorr & Chaim Malinowitz eds., 2000) (expounding on the concepts enumerated and
providing the scriptural sources for the holdings of the Babylonian Talmudic masters).

2020

WRONGFUL LIFE IN THE AGE OF CRISPR-CAS

471

person, and one who is childless,233 suggesting that at least for legal
purposes,234 compensation for such suffering, if not for living, is justified.
Today, a half-century after the first wrongful life cases were decided,
the “sanctity of life” no longer enjoys the same societal veneration it once
did.235 This is especially so when children are born disabled, diseased, or
with severe physical or mental challenges.236 Today’s society voices a
distinct respect for “the quality of life” which must be balanced against its
sanctity. This theme repeatedly surfaces in current fiction as novelists
compose stories illustrating lives so horrific such that to sentence someone
to “serve” out this type of life without recompense would be “cruel and
unusual.” In this vein, euthanasia has gained limited acceptance in parts of
the United States and in some countries in Europe.237 Interestingly,
economic considerations are sometimes recognized as a valid basis to
determine whether a life is worth maintaining at the public’s expense, even

233. The sources for the Talmudic determination are: “A poor person is accounted as
dead” is derived from Exodus 4:19 which says, “for all the men are dead who sought [your]
life” (interpreted to mean that they had been stricken with poverty); a person affected by
skin disease (צֹרע
ָ  ְמּ, metzora) is accounted as dead, derives from Numbers 12:10–12 which
says, “[A]nd Aaron looked upon Miriam, and behold, she was leprous ( ְמצֹ ָרﬠַת, metzora’at).
And Aaron said unto Moses . . . ‘[l]et her not . . . be as one dead . . . .’” “The blind are
accounted as dead,” derives from Lamentations 3:6 which says, “He has set me in dark
places, as they that be dead of old.” “[O]ne who is childless is accounted as dead” derives
from Genesis 30:1, where Rachel said, “Give me children, or else I [am dead].”
234. In practice, religious physicians often hold out hope for a patient until the last
breath is taken. Interview with oncologist Dr. Yasher Hirshaut, (Aug. 11, 2018) (notes on
file with author). In Israel, this approach manifests in a reverence for human life that
transcends ethical and cultural norms of other countries. Shulamit Almog & Sharon
Bassan, The Politics of Pro and Non Reproduction Policies in Israel, 14 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 27 (2018) at 50 (noting that “[t]o create life is no less important than to
preserve life in any form, even in the medical aspect . . . the barrenness disease or the
infertility disease is no less fatal than cancer”). See also Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689, 691 (N.J. 1967), abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); see also
Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (Nev. 1995); see generally Barbara Prainsack,
Negotiating Life: The Regulation of Human Cloning and Embryonic Stem Cell Research
in Israel, 36 SOC. STUD. SCI. 173 (2006) (discussing the cultural priority and policy of
creating life in Israel, in some respects due to the Holocaust experience).
235. Anne Gilmore, Sanctity of life versus quality of life – the continuing debate, 130
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 180, 180 (1984) (noting that “health care professionals are at the
centre of a debate that juxtaposes the strongly held belief that any kind of life is better than
no life at all, with the principle that life is worth saving and respecting only if it passes
some test of fitness and value”).
236. See JONATHAN GLOVER, CHOOSING CHILDREN: GENES, DISABILITY AND DESIGN
6–27 (2006).
237. See, e.g., An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments
to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), S.C. 2016, c 3 (Can.), available at
https://bit.ly/2SW1rCW.
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justifying euthanasia.238 These baser considerations are condoned—so
long as abortion is not!239
Social views are often best captured in literature. In 1987, Octavia
Butler wrote a science fiction story about children who sustained a
horrific, genetically-transmitted disease caused by cancer drugs ingested
by their parents. The story is loosely based on Lesch-Nyhan syndrome
introduced at the outset of this Article.240 This is an X-linked recessive
disease, passed on by mothers to their sons, just as our hypothetical Lana
might pass on to her son.241 Children suffering from the disease selfimmolate. They also sustain neurological deficits and intellectual
disability. These desperate lives, however, are not limited to fiction242 and
I can only hope those who claim that any life is worth living, no matter
what, never read Butler’s gruesome depiction of what a ghoulish life of
uncontrollable self-mutilation might be like and recognize that life itself
can, indeed, be intolerable.243
c.

The Mysteries of Non-Life Argument and its
Corollary-Quantification of Damages

A corollary of the “sanctity of life” argument (where any life is better
than none) is the “mysteries of life argument” (i.e., we cannot know what
“no life” means, so we cannot evaluate consequent damages). Here, the
courts take a flying pass, claiming that: “[w]hether it is better never to have
been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a
mystery more properly left to the philosophers and the theologians.”244
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio echoed this sentiment, stating:
“because [wrongful life] claims force courts to weigh the value of being
238. See Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Case-studies in Bioethics Briefs: The Right to Die
and Refuse to Die (Aug. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at https://bit.ly/39zGxz8; Death with Dignity: When euthanasia is imposed by a
third party, 14 BIOETHICS LEAFLET 31, 31–35 (2016) (Isr.), available at
http://bioethicsnews.zefat.ac.il/inner.aspx?id=316&cat=64
(unpublished
English
manuscript) (discussing the David Dunn case, where a hospital denied life-prolongation
technology to a sentient patient who expressly did not wish to die).
239. A position rejected by Judge Bruce Kaufman in Speck v. Finegold, where he
noted that “[t]he question is not the worth and sanctity of life, but whether the doctors were
negligent in their surgical attempts at vasectomy and abortion.” See Speck v. Finegold, 439
A.2d 110, 117 n.1 (Pa. 1981) (opinion of Kauffman, J.) (quoting Speck v. Finegold, 408
A.2d 496, 503 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)).
240. OCTAVIA E. BUTLER, T H E E V E N I N G A N D T H E M O R N I N G A ND T H E N I G H T
69 (1991).
241. A situation addressed by Parfit. See infra Part VI.
242. See Faith Ridler, ‘All I want for my birthday . . . is to DIE’: The heartbreaking
plea of 11-year-old daughter who is in constant pain due to incurable bladder condition,
DAILY MAIL (Jan. 19, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://dailym.ai/2Mj8TT0.
243. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 489–90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980), disapproved by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (en banc).
244. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
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versus nonbeing, courts have been reluctant to recognize this cause of
action.”245
Or as the court in Gleitman couched it:
Ultimately, the infant’s complaint is that he would be better off not to
have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness,
cannot possibly know whether that is so. We must remember that the
choice is not between being born with health or being born without
it . . . . Rather the choice is between a worldly existence and none at
all . . . . To recognize a right not to be born is to enter an area in which
no one could find his way.246

But philosophy Professor David Heyd admonishes that “there is
really nothing to know here, even for philosophers,”247 and castigates such
judicial reasoning as a cop-out, chastising judges who think philosophers
possess some superior or privileged access to this kind of knowledge. At
least one court even called the “fear to tread” argument nothing more than
court-admitted incompetence.248 Professor Heyd concurs: “[w]e do not
understand ‘the unknown’ simply because there is nothing about it to
understand. . . . [N]o one has anything interesting to say… [and] the
conceptual coherence of the claim should concern both philosophers and
judges.”249
When the “sanctity of life” and the mystery of life excuses are
extinguished, courts must look elsewhere to eviscerate the damage claim
for these reproductive harms. A tangent of the mysteries of life corollary
is now invoked, called the “the value of life conundrum.” Courts denying
wrongful life claims explain their rationale as the impossibility of valuing
that which we consider priceless: life, itself. This approach strikes me as
the height of disingenuity, as every wrongful death case involves valuing

245. Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E. 2d 1161, 1164 (Ohio 2000) (citing Bowman v.
Davis, 356 N.E. 2d 496, 499 n.3 (Ohio 1976) (emphasis added)).
246. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (N.J. 1967) (Weintraub, C.J.,
dissenting in part); see also Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 541 (S.C.D.C.
1980) (reviewing the state of law on wrongful life claims and discussing Gleitman v.
Cosgrove in depth).
247. David Heyd, Are “Wrongful Life” Claims Philosophically Valid?: A Critical
Analysis of a Recent Court Decision, 21 ISR. L. REV. 574, 583 (1986) [hereinafter Are
“Wrongful Life” Claims Philosophically Valid?] (essentially calling the judges chicken
(my word) and exposing their hiding behind the philosopher’s curtain even as they rely on
social and moral reasoning to make their decision). It should be noted that Professor Heyd
personally opposes the wrongful life claim but on different grounds than espoused by the
judiciary or by Parfit himself. Email interview with David Heyd, Professor, Hebrew Univ.
of Jerusalem (Dec. 2018).
248. “[T]he [Becker] court declared itself incompetent to decide whether it is better
never to have been born than to have been born even with gross deficiencies . . . .” Speck
v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386
N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978)).
249. Are “Wrongful Life” Claims Philosophically Valid?, supra note 247, at 583–84.
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a human life. Further, courts have acknowledged the difficulties in
quantifying damages is not a bar.250 Yet, here it is, surfacing in a twisted
iteration and rejected. Thus, by framing the child’s claim as one for being
alive,251 which they consider a blessing,252 and focusing on the restorative
purpose of negligence, judges reject the claim as incalculable.
In essence, [the child] claims that her very life is “wrongful.” . . .
[However, t]he primary purpose of tort law is that of compensating
plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered wrongfully at the hands of
others. As such, damages are ordinarily computed by “comparing the
condition plaintiff would have been in, had the defendants not been
negligent, with plaintiff’s impaired condition as a result of the
negligence.”253

But since the alternative is nonlife, courts say calculating the infant’s
damages is impossible:254
No one knows what it is like not to be born. Consequently, it is
impossible to know or even speculate on the correct compensation in
wrongful life. What dollar amount equates “to be” with “not to be?”
Where these suits have been denied, the rationale has often rested on
the speculative nature of the damage calculation or a public policy
denial that life can ever be wrong. It is perceived by some courts to be
against our social and moral underpinnings to consider life a wrong.
Life is not an injury; therefore, it must inevitably be considered a good.

250. Id.
251. Frasca, supra note 104, at 187, 199 (explaining that the harm incident to
wrongful life and birth is “independent from the negligence” of a physician and the true
harm is “the birth of the child”).
252. Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 419 (R.I. 1997) (Bourcier, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
253. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11–12 (N.J. 1979); see WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 336, 335–38 (4th ed. 1971); see also Harry F.
Klodowski, Jr., Comment, Wrongful Life and A Fundamental Right to be Born Healthy:
Park v. Chessin; Becker v. Schwartz, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 555–59 (1978).
254. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978); see also Kassama v.
Magat, 767 A.2d 348, 363–69 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (holding that there is no cause of
action for wrongful life “because it is an impossible task to calculate damages based on a
comparison between life in an impaired state and no life at all”), aff’d, 792 A.2d 1102 (Md.
2002); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Whether it is better never
to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery
more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can assert
no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the very nearly uniform high
value which the law and mankind has placed on human life, rather than its absence. Not
only is there to be found no predicate at common law or in statutory enactment for judicial
recognition of the birth of a defective child as an injury to the child; the implications of any
such proposition are staggering. Would claims be honored, assuming the breach of an
identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by whom would
perfection be defined?”).
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It is a contradiction to award damages for life while maintaining laws
against assisted suicide and euthanasia.255

Of course, it must be noted that assisted suicide and euthanasia are
generally illegal, and abortion is not. But no matter.
Thus, one focus in cases rejecting wrongful life is that damages
cannot be calculated because the child’s claim is not to have been born at
all. As the court in Gleitman notes, “[t]his Court cannot weigh the value
of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting
that he should not have been born, the infant makes it logically impossible
. . . to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making
the comparison required by compensatory remedies.”256
Similarly, the court in Williams v. State noted that:
[T]he defendant [did not commit] the acts causing injury, and the
position in which the plaintiff presently finds herself. The damages
sought by the plaintiff in the case at bar involve a determination as to
whether nonexistence or nonlife is preferable to life as an illegitimate
with all the hardship attendant thereon. It is impossible to make that
choice.257

The ipse dixit posture of this opinion can be seen by comparing the
vituperative and contrary opinions in Speck v. Finegold.258 Speck presents
a virtually identical fact pattern as Berman, Becker, and Gleitman: a
malpractice suit against physicians for failing to prevent the birth of a child
with a congenital (and foreseeable) injury. Three of the six sitting judges
in Speck would allow the child to sue for wrongful life; three oppose it.
Three judges wrote separate opinions, pulling no punches. The rationale
behind the opinions clearly reflects the judges’ idiosyncratic views,
highlighting the personal opinions driving the opinion. Thus, while one
judge opined that “[i]n the case of a claim predicated upon wrongful life,
such a computation would require the trier of fact to measure the
difference in value between life in an impaired condition and the ‘utter
void of nonexistence,’”259 another judge reached the diametrically
opposite conclusion:
I reject the proposition that our law is so rigid and inflexible that, to
recognize a cause of action here, we must conclude that [the plaintiff]
would have been better off had she never been born. The reality is that

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Frasca, supra note 104, at 196.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 345 (N.Y. 1966) (Keating, J., concurring).
Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 n.5 (Pa. 1981).
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979).
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she exists and that her existence is . . . “foreseeably and inextricably”
coupled with a painful and disfiguring disease.260

Still, another judge flat out calls “[t]he view that we cannot calculate
the value of existence as compared to nonexistence” as “hyper-scholastic”
nonsense.261 Judge Kauffman goes even further. Specifically rejecting the
idea that the court is asked to enter the realm of the metaphysical, Judge
Kauffman states, “[b]efore us, unfortunately, is a living and breathing, but
incurably diseased, deformed and suffering human being who never had a
chance to be born healthy and who will be in need of extraordinary medical
and other special care for the rest of her days.”262 He then opines that “[f]or
the majority . . . to turn their backs on this existing child and to disregard
her actual suffering and exceptional need for medical and other assistance
is a calloused and unjust act.”263
In concluding this section, the Curlender opinion resounds. Therein,
the court held that “there is not universal acceptance of the notion that . . .
‘religious beliefs,’ [regarding the “sanctity of life”] rather than law, should
govern the situation.”264 Instead, “the dissents have emphasized that
considerations of public policy should include regard for social
welfare.”265 The court went on to note that:
[i]t is neither necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on the
mysteries of life, . . . [before concluding that they] need not be
concerned with the fact that [if the defendant had] not been negligent,
the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all . . . the reality of
the “wrongful-life concept” [was] that such a plaintiff both exist[ed]
and suffer[ed].266

But that approach seems to have died with the decision.
Again, it must be recalled that in the WGM cases brought thus far—
against sperm banks for implanting the wrong embryo or improperly tested
sperm—the child is not claiming the right not to be born. Rather, the child
asserts her/his right to have her/his genes selected with due care, or at least
as designated by its mother. The child seeks damages for harm occasioned
by the lack thereof. The child further claims the right not to be diseased,

260. Speck, 439 A.2d at 118 n.3 (opinion of Kauffman, J.) (noting that damages
cannot be measured with exactitude and precision).
261. Id. at 115 (opinion of Flaherty, J.).
262. Id. at 118 (opinion of Kauffman, J.).
263. Id.; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961–62 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (“[I]t
is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child would
“disavow” the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not entitled to the full
measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to all members of society.”);
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 357 (8th ed. 2012).
264. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
265. Id. at 486–87.
266. Id. at 488.
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not to be saddled with a gene that s/he will pass on to her or his offspring,
and not incur risks of disease in excess of that to which the general
population is subjected. The claim that such damages cannot be calculated
is specious—the comparison is between a child born with cystic fibrosis,
fragile X syndrome, polycystic kidney disease, or increased risk of
schizophrenia, for example, and a child born without these anomalies and
diseases, not some inchoate claim not to have been born at all.
d.

Restorative Justice vs. Deterrence

A policy articulating that damages are incalculable cannot be based
on judges’ “idiosyncratic” and personal (religious?) views.267 For such an
objection to have legal weight, it must be translated into some
recognizable legal framework. Two such contexts are attempted. One is
that the claim is not capable of achieving restorative justice. The other is
that there is no guaranteed right to be free from genetic defects.268 The
reformulated damage aspect of wrongful life (i.e., that it fails to further the
legal function of restorative justice)269 is inapplicable in our context
because restoring the infant-plaintiff to non-birth is not the issue here. As
Justices Flaherty and Kauffman note in Speck,270 the child is born harmed
and “[i]t would be bizarre to argue that [the] plaintiffs . . . are not
injured.”271
Additionally, restorative justice is not the only, nor necessarily the
primary, objective of tort law.272 As explained in Speck, the duty of care is
imposed not only “to compensate the victim,” but to “deter negligence”
and “encourage due care.”273 Significantly, the court noted:

267. Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 119–20 & n.4 (Pa. 1981) (Nix, J., dissenting).
268. Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 56.
269. After all, the child is alive. Many courts believe that being alive can never be
said to constitute a harm. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984) (“Our
decision to allow the recovery of extraordinary medical expenses is not premised on the
concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired life, but is predicated on the needs of the
living.”); see also Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(Evans, J., concurring) (“[W]e conclude that while a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action
may not recover general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at
all, the child—like his or her parents—may recover special damages for the extraordinary
expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.”) (citing Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d
954, 966 (Cal. 1982) (en banc)); see generally Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483
(Wash. 1983) (en banc) (allowing both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions, and
holding that recognition of these claims encourages due care in genetic counseling and
prenatal testing and neither undermines the “sanctity of life” nor disparages people with
disabilities).
270. Speck, 439 A.2d at 116 (opinion of Flaherty, J.).
271. Id. As Judge Kauffman pointedly notes, “[a]ny argument that this life of
suffering is not the natural and probable consequence of appellees’ misconduct is rank
sophistry.” Id. at 118 (opinion of Kauffman, J.).
272. See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 35–36.
273. Speck, 439 A.2d at 114
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[This] “prophylactic” factor of preventing future harm has been quite
important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with
compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer.
When the decisions of the courts become known, and defendants
realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive
to prevent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for
imposing liability is the deliberate purpose of providing that
incentive . . . . [T]o deny plaintiffs even the opportunity to present their
case in a court would be to grant an unjustifiable and unfair windfall
to the defendants, who would escape liability for the harm resulting
from their alleged negligence.274

As one commentator said, “without damages there can be no
deterrence. Negligent beginnings is a unique area of law where deterrence,
rather than victim compensation, is the driving force for damages.”275
IV. THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE: PARFIT’S NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM
INFECTS THE LAW
A.

Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem: A Standing Argument

The fourth rationale for voiding claims for wrongful life vests in the
tangled theories of Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem,276 also known as
the “paradox of [the] future individuals.”277 This philosophical concept
which has been co-opted by the law278 deals with “the new field of the
ethics regarding future people,”279 including “whether people can
complain [about] having been born in an inferior condition to that of other
people who could have been born in their stead had we acted
differently.”280 Whether this concept is appropriate for legal uses is the
subject of this section.
274. Id. at 114–15; see also Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 483, 496.
275. See Frasca, supra note 104, at 199; see also Speck, 439 A.2d at 115; Wuth ex
rel. Kessler v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
276. See Michael B. Laudor, In Defense of Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory
to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1675, 1676–80 (1994); see also W. Ryan
Schuster, Rights Gone Wrong: A Case Against Wrongful Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2329, 2356–62 (2016).
277. David Benatar, The Wrong of Wrongful Life, 37 AM. PHIL. Q. 175, 175 (2000)
(quoting Gregory S. Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93
(1982)).
278. See, e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 28, (suggesting that children have a cause of
action against their parents for pre-birth injuries).
279. David Heyd, Parfit on the Non-identity Problem, Again, 8 LAW & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 1, 1, 2 n.3 (2014) (noting that Heyd also discusses the concept, creating the term
“Genethics”) [hereinafter Parfit on the Non-Identity Problem]; see also David Heyd, The
Intractability of the Nonidentity Problem, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS: ETHICS, GENETICS
AND THE NONIDENTITY PROBLEM 3, 4 (Melinda A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds.,
2009).
280. Parfit on the Non-Identity Problem, supra note 279, at 2. Professor Heyd
reminds us that “there is the further and not irrelevant question about reproductive choices
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In a more convoluted manner of expression than that used by the
Becker court, this view claims that the child-plaintiff would not have been
born281 but for the misfeasance or malpractice. Hence, as I would
paraphrase it in legal parlance, the child lacks standing to sue, since but
for the negligence, the child would not have been born. Framing the issue
this way highlights the distinction between claims that could be brought
for malpractice282 and claims for WGM (including sperm bank
malfeasance, e.g., switched sperm, embryo or implantation of inapt
gametogenic material). In the former case, the child who exists would
never have existed at all;283 in fact, no child would have existed. In the
latter case, someone would exist in whose shoes this child stands, although
perhaps not this particular child. Thus, in a twist of causal consequences,
but for the negligent acts, this particular plaintiff would not be here. The
standing issue is similar, but not the same. In the former case, no one
would have existed. In the latter, it would have been a different person, but
someone would exist to bring a claim. This distinction is critical in
developing a resolution, as will be seen in Part V.
Getting back to Parfit, it is important to note that Parfit’s thoughtexperiment originates in the context of evaluating societal decisions that
are made now, but affect generations in the future (not whether a parent
should take steps to avoid birthing a genetically impaired child).284
Perhaps Parfit’s initial concern might be said to be similar to that raised
by Becker and Donovan—i.e., is it better to be born or not to be born—but
on a global or societal level. However, this is not the issue in WGM cases.
Here, the question is whether it is better for an individual to be born with
a genetic defect or without one. Or, where the child is born with a genetic
defect that greatly increases the risk of disease over the background level,
does that child have a right to sue—not for some hypothetical increased
risk, but for the constant unremitting fear the disease will occur? Should
whose alternatives are just avoiding completely the conception of new children.” Id. at 13.
While opposed to this right for the individual, Heyd does acknowledge that the world
(a.k.a. society) might have an interest in promoting this, thus cohering with my advocating
using public nuisance theory to sustain such a claim. See id. at 3; Billauer, Sperminator,
supra note 13, at 60.
281. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 75–76 (1994) (“[I]n many cases of concern the alleged
harm to offspring occurs from birth itself . . . . Preventing harm would mean preventing the
birth of the child whose interests one is trying to protect.”); see also Dov Fox, Luck, Genes,
and Equality, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 712, 713 (2007) (“[I]t makes little sense, . . . to
consider whether the person resulting from genetic selection from among multiple potential
lives is better or worse off on account of any pre-natal interventions taken on her behalf.”).
282. What Professor Fox calls “procreation imposed.” See Fox, supra note 30, at 154
n.24, 185–93; see also Billauer, Re-Birthing, supra note 14, at 7–15.
283. Notwithstanding the criticality of this concept as a means to reject the wrongful
life claim, there is a body of cases (pre-conception tort), which allows claims when children
have not been born, or even conceived. See infra Section V.B.
284. PARFIT, supra note 25, at 364.
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that child be allowed recovery for medical monitoring, other prophylactic
costs, and the annoyance of being subjected to the same? Parfit deals with
this issue separately. But what Parfit actually says is not what others say
he says.285 In fact, Parfit rejects the idea that actively creating the type of
harm which is the subject of WGM and wrongful life cases should not be
redressed.
First, Parfit rejects the notion that a dichotomous answer is always
possible in this context.286 Second, Parfit notes a distinction when the
activity in question creates a different person than intended—as opposed
to one which fails to generate any person at all. His reasoning derives from
his focus on the number of persons ultimately born (i.e., whether decisions
made today will affect the number, not merely the identity of people born
centuries down the road). By comparison, as stated above, in WGM cases
the question is not whether any child will be born (as it is in the failed
sterilization/abortion cases), rather, it is whether this particular child—
having this particular genetic defect—will be born. In this situation, the
total number of birthed children is the same. But, if harm can be avoided
in one of these birth outcomes, failure to do so, Parfit would say, should
be compensable.287 Here, Parfit discusses blame which can be translated
into providing for damages in negligence: “We can deserve to be blamed
for harming others, even when this is not worse for them.”288 How much
more would Parfit subscribe to this theory when the outcome is, in fact,
worse for the resultant child, and when some third party negligently causes
that harm?
When it comes to preventing harm, Parfit goes further, indicating that
whether this is done pre-conception or during pregnancy, there is no
difference.289 This view is at odds with the prevailing legal opinion. Going
285. Email interview with David Heyd, Professor, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem (Dec.
2018). Professor Heyd, however, “out-Parfit’s” Parfit and subscribes to the NIP doctrine.
See Are “Wrongful Life” Claims Philosophically Valid?, supra note 247, at 582. The
Zeitsov case, CA 518/82 Zeitsov v. Katz, 40(2) SC 85 (1986) (Isr.), has since been
overruled. See CC (Hi) 745/02 Hammer v. Prof. Amit (2006) (Isr.) (following Professor
Heyd’s view).
286. See PARFIT, supra note 25, at 352 (“We are inclined to believe that any question
about our identity must have an answer, which must be either Yes or No . . . I reject this
view. There are cases in which our identity is indeterminate.”).
287. ID. at 364.
288. Id. at 370–72 (“[B]eneficence and human well-being, cannot be explained in
person-affecting terms. Its fundamental principles will not be concerned with whether our
acts will be good or bad for those people whom they effect.”).
289. Id. at 368–69 (“‘If there will be people with some handicap, the fact that they
are handicapped is bad.’ . . . [When] there [is] a different group of handicapped people
[][t]he people in the first group would not be worse off than the people in the second group
would have been [if both groups are handicapped].”). If Parfit believes there is no
difference in comparing two groups of handicapped persons, would he not believe that in
comparing handicapped versus non-handicapped, promoting the latter is the better moral
good? Id. at 369 (“[W]e ought to choose to cure [one] group only if they have a stronger
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full circle to the morality approach which contends that some life—even
one with a deficit—is better than no life, Parfit castigates a mother who
passes on an inheritable disease to a son, but who could have avoided this
by selecting to have a daughter via IVF—which she eschews.290 If an act
can prevent disease, such as properly performed genetic selection, Parfit
contends that this is the moral approach. In other words, a different child
without disease is a better result than a child who is afflicted.291
In sum, those championing the NIP do not specifically rely on the
“morality/sanctity of life” approach. They would also support a child’s
claim if the child is harmed in utero, as opposed to one harmed prior to
implantation during the fertilization process. Thus, if the genetic
intervention were attempted during pregnancy and that intervention went
wrong, an ensuing child could bring a claim.292 Only because the same
action occurred prior to implantation—with the possibility that another
embryo could have been implanted in its stead with a different child being
born—does the child who was in fact born lose the right to sue under the
NIP. The law agrees.293
B.

Damages for Injury In Utero

Paralleling the current state of denying recovery in wrongful life cases
is the development of cases for prenatal torts. In early legal lore, all
prenatal torts were excluded from compensation because the conceptus
was regarded as part of its mother and, therefore, its claims were subsumed
by hers.294 Similarly, at one time killing a fetus in utero would have been
considered property damage, compensated according to the wealth of the
family.295 However, perhaps foreshadowing Professor Fox’s bold venture
into new-tort creation,296 some half-century ago “common law rule
suffered a ‘spectacular[ly] abrupt reversal’” unprecedented in the whole
history of the law of torts.297 Sometime during the early 1970s courts
determined that “‘no one is to be denied compensation for injury merely

claim to be cured . . . If Pre-Conception Testing would achieve results in [just] a few more
cases, I would judge it to be the better programme.”).
290. Id. at 375–76.
291. Id.
292. See Smolensky, supra note 162, at 324 n.147, 332.
293. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000);
see also Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
294. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15, 17 (Mass. 1884).
295. See Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Abortion, Moral Law, and the First Amendment:
The Conflict Between Fetal Rights & Freedom of Religion, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 271, 301–06 (2017).
296. See generally Fox, supra note 30.
297. Sohn, supra note 230, at 158 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971)).
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because the harm was inflicted before that person’s birth.’”298 That broad
sweeping language, however, was to be revoked if used to recompense a
child seeking damages for the harms caused by WGM.
Today, most jurisdictions expand legal protection afforded to the
unborn where the injury occurs during pregnancy,299 or even before
conception,300 a feature with direct applicability to WGM cases, as will be
discussed below. It is important to note that in these in utero cases, a
negligent tortfeasor is liable for all damages proximately resulting from
her or his negligence, including the costs of raising that child.301 Generally
speaking, then, all foreseeable harm is compensable if it is caused during
pregnancy and the harmed child is born alive.302 The dicta in Bonbrest v.
Kotz seems to go further, impliedly rejecting the often sublimated notion

298. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 288 (2000)); see also
Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I. 1966) (discussing a child that was born with
physical defects allegedly because defendants negligently failed to prescribe gamma
globulin for the mother during her pregnancy, notwithstanding defendant’s knowledge of
her exposure to German measles, noting that “‘justice requires that the principle be
recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body,’ and that
‘[i]f the wrongful conduct of another interferes with that right, and it can be established
by competent proof that there is a causal connection between the wrongful interference and
the harm suffered by the child when born, damages for such harm should be recoverable
by the child.’”(quoting Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 502–03 (N.J. 1960))). But see
Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 346 (Nev. 1995) (holding that a child born with
severe deformities from undiagnosed rubella during her mother’s pregnancy was not
permitted to maintain a cause of action).
299. See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956)
(holding that a child injured before birth may bring a cause of action); Amann v. Faidy,
114 N.E.2d 412, 417–18 (Ill. 1953) (examining a case in which a fetus suffered prenatal
injuries, was born alive, and then died of those injuries, was held within state’s wrongful
death act); Grp. Health Ass’n, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1207 (Md. 1983)
(recognizing the general principle of right of action for prenatal injuries); see also Gerard
M. Bambrick, Developing Maternal Liability Standards for Prenatal Injury, 61 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 592, 593 n.4 (1987) (“The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every
jurisdiction to maintain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies
of such injuries after birth an action will lie for his wrongful death.” (quoting W. KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984))).
300. See Preconception Tort as a Basis for Recovery, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 275, 285–
86 (1982) (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977)).
301. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478–79 (7th Cir. 1981); see also
Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 1951) (giving a history of pre-birth damage
holdings and noting that “while legislative bodies have the power to change old rules of
law, nevertheless, when they fail to act, it is the duty of the court to bring the law into
accordance with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than ‘with some
outworn and antiquated rule of the past’. . . . We act in the finest common-law tradition
when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice”).
302. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138, 140–41 (D.D.C. 1946) (noting that “the
wrongful act which constitutes the crime may constitute also a tort, and if the law
recognizes the separate existence of the unborn child sufficiently to punish the crime, it is
difficult to see why it should not also recognize its separate existence for the purpose of
redressing the tort.” (quoting Montreal Tramways Co. v. Léveillé, [1933] S.C.R. 456, 464
(Can.))).
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that a wrongful birth action can subsume those claims presented by the
wrongful life claim:
If a child . . . has no right of action for prenatal injuries, we have a
wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for, although the father
may be entitled to compensation for the loss he has incurred and the
mother for what she has suffered, yet there is a residuum of injury for
which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the child. If a
right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without any
fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another’s fault
and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience
without any compensation therefor.303

Such is the holding in the thalidomide cases, for example, where
children were eventually compensated for injuries the drug caused them
during gestation.304 British statutes implement this notion into law, making
it patently clear that the “child, if born alive, may sue for injury in‐
utero,”305 and “[i]f a child is born disabled as the result of such an
occurrence before its birth . . . and a person . . . is . . . answerable to the
child in respect of the occurrence, the child’s disabilities are to be regarded
as damage resulting from the wrongful act of that person and
actionable . . . .”306
This approach has been applied to injuries occurring even before
conception,307 a feature with direct applicability to WGM cases, as will be
discussed in greater detail in the following section. For now, it is
noteworthy to add that the English statute extends the concept to damage
accruing from IVF (and in sperm bank) cases:308
In any case where a child carried by a woman as the result of [any of
several fertility treatments] is born disabled,309 [and] the disability
results from an act or omission in the course of the selection . . . of the
embryo carried by her or of the gametes used to bring about the
303. Id. at 141–42.
304. See Harold Evans, Thalidomide: how men who blighted lives of thousands
evaded justice, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:11 PM), https://bit.ly/1xZ02rq.
305. Dominic Wilkinson et al., Protecting Future Children from In‐Utero Harm, 30
BIOETHICS 425, 425–26 (2016).
306. Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, c. 28, § 1(1) (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/28.
307. See Preconception Tort as a Basis for Recovery, supra note 300, at 286.
308. Id.; see also HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990, C. 37, § 44
1A(1)–(2) (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/37.
309. The British Fertilisation and Embryology Authority is quite cognizant of the
profit-making motivation of these enterprises, with the press calling them “IVF rip off
clinics.” See Kamal Ahuja & Nick Macklon, The HFEA statement on add-ons in IVF can
turn hope into reality, BIONEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://bit.ly/2tADKoJ (noting that “The
HFEA [is] . . . insisting that all fertility treatments be ‘offered ethically’ . . . [by] seeking
to create a culture of change among fertility professionals in the UK that protects patients
from potential exploitation . . . “).
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creation of the embryo, and a person is under this section answerable
to the child in respect of the act or omission, the child’s disabilities are
to be regarded as damage resulting from the wrongful act of that
person and actionable accordingly at the suit of the child.310

C.

Paradoxes in Pregnancy (The DES Cases)

With the foregoing in mind, it is easy to see that there is something
circular and vaguely disquieting behind the reasoning adduced from the
NIP to defeat wrongful life cases in the context of WGM, i.e., the
“defected” child cannot sue because but for the negligence s/he would not
have been born. The negligence has put the prospective plaintiff in a
Schrodinger’s cat situation: the plaintiff is both injured and barred from
suit because of that injury. In other words, but for the negligence, the child
would not have the injury. However, the child also would not be alive to
sue and, in fact, that child would not have been born at all. Thus, the injury
is being born, a condition necessary both for the child’s life as well as for
her/his inclination to bring suit. In other words, but for this negligence, the
child would not have been born, and so s/he cannot sue. Had the child been
born without a defect, there would be no reason to sue, so the actual
damage is being born with a defect, not whether the child is born at all.
Alternatively, it can be said that the injury confers on the child the
unfortunate position of having been harmed, while the harm (being born
with a defect) renders the child powerless to sue. Indeed, it might be said
that this child is deprived of the right to sue precisely because that child
lacks standing to sue, thus illustrating the circular reasoning identified at
the outset of this paragraph.
The NIP, therefore, creates a situation of trichotomous legal results,
illustrated below. If the injury occurred prior to implantation, the child is
deprived of redress. However, if the same injury happened by human
intervention in utero, the child would be able to sue because that child’s
identity has already been cemented. It must be recalled that basic
negligence law holds that it is not the act that gives rise to suit, but the
consequences of the act. That maxim falls flat, however, when the NIP

310. HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990, C. 37, § 44 1A(1) (Eng.)
(emphasis added); see also ROSALIND English, IVF Doctor not liable for failing to warn
parents of genetic disorder in child—Australian Supreme Court, UK HUM. RTS. BLOG
(May 21, 2013), https://bit.ly/2N7Y8VR (“Since 1999 (MacFarlane v. Tayside Health
Board) such [claims] have been refused on grounds of public policy – for the birth of a
healthy baby, that is. As far as disabled children are concerned, parents can [seek] the
additional costs attributable to the disability . . . .”). But see Waller v. James [2013]
NSWSC 497 (Austl.) (suggesting that an IVF case presents as per Professor Fox’s typical
pregnancy-imposed case. The court in Waller v. James did not find the fertility doctor liable
for failing to advise the parents of the “‘myriad range’ of genetic conditions” because the
fertility doctor, whose expertise was not genetics, “had been retained to assess a fertility
assistance problem,” not to advise regarding genetic conditions).
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infiltrates law. In these cases, the act and its consequences are the same.
The differences are the locus of the harm—was it in a test-tube, a petri
dish, or in utero—as well as the timing of the negligence—pre- or postimplantation or gestation.
To illustrate the situation: let us assume the harm this child suffers
was caused post-fertilization, a state analogous to post-conception.
Consider a child born deaf. Generally, this would be considered “an act of
God” and a lawsuit—by the mother or the child—would not lie. Now, let
us say the mother is tested during pregnancy for a defect indicating
deafness. The mother claims she cannot raise a deaf child and would abort
the fetus if tests show deafness. Assume, further, that the doctor or
geneticist fails to detect the abnormality and a child is born deaf.311 Again,
no lawsuit for wrongful life exists, and only a limited claim for damages312
accrues under classic wrongful birth analysis for depriving the mother of
a “right” to abort.
However, if the mother took antibiotics during pregnancy, and this
was the proximate cause of the deafness, the child would well be able to
bring an action—certainly against the pharmaceutical manufacturer, if not
the physician for prescribing the drug. All ensuing damages, including a
lifetime of pain and suffering, would be compensable. Now assume,
instead, that the fetus has a genetic defect causal for deafness that could
be rectified during pregnancy. Assume the child is operated on in utero,
but the operation was performed negligently and this child, too, is born
deaf. According to the prevailing theory, this child, too, would be able to
bring suit because there is no non-identity problem.
Now, imagine several embryos are produced during an IVF
procedure. The embryos are tested pre-implantation, but the wrong
embryo, one carrying a gene for deafness, is implanted. According to the
NIP, this child could not sue because but for its implantation, it would not
have been born.313 The muddled and confusing situation arising when the
same injury is caused by the same doctor or sperm bank but results in
different holdings is the stuff that invites Supreme Court reviews and law
review articles and demands legal resolution.
The disparity of results presented by the NIP is further illustrated by
the Diethylstilbesterol (“DES”) litigation: “During 1938–1971, U.S.
physicians prescribed DES to pregnant women to prevent
miscarriages . . . . As a result, an estimated 5–10 million pregnant women

311. Sarah-Kate Templeton, Deaf demand right to designer deaf children, SUNDAY
TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/39JUvhQ.
312. See Emerson v. Magendentz, 689 A.2d 409, 412 (R.I. 1997).
313. See Smolensky, supra note 162, at 301, 331; see also PARFIT, supra note 25, at
352.
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and the children born of these pregnancies were exposed to DES.”314 In
1971, DES was identified “as a cause of a rare vaginal cancer in girls and
young women who had been exposed to DES before birth (in the
womb).”315 Similar to the thalidomide cases, these children were allowed
to sue. But the DES cases differ from thalidomide (or other drugs ingested
in utero causing harm), even though ingestion of the drug by their mothers
also occurred during pregnancy, because DES was used to prevent
miscarriage. This means that but for the consumption of the drug, the
offspring of DES mothers likely would not have survived pregnancy. In
fact, the drug harmed the very children it was designed to foster.316
In the DES cases, even though but for the negligence, the children
would not have existed, the courts allowed them to sue.317 In fact, in these
cases, American courts actually expanded the capacity to sue
pharmaceutical manufacturers, both broadening the statute of
limitations318 and establishing a novel concept of recovery: the concept of
market share liability. Under this novel theory, where mothers could not
identify the brand they ingested, the entire industry was considered liable
and all manufacturers were held accountable. The damages each
manufacturer paid were calculated on a pro-rata basis of their market
share. 319 This innovative concept was judicially created so that
manufacturers could not hide under the claim that their product was
unidentifiable.320
It bears repeating that in the DES cases, these children (as in the case
of those born of WGM) likely would not have been born but for the
defendants’ negligent actions, and their mothers’ ingestion of the drug.
Strictly speaking, the NIP should kick in here, too. However, not only are
these daughters allowed to sue for the harms they sustained, but the burden
314. See DES History, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://bit.ly/2lOPuk9 (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
315. Id.; see also Marieke Veurink et al., The History of DES, Lessons to Be Learned,
27 PHARMACY WORLD & SCI. 139, 139–43 (2005).
316. DES History, supra note 314 (“In 1953, published research showed that DES
did not prevent miscarriages or premature births. However, DES continued to be prescribed
until 1971. In that year, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) issued a Drug Bulletin
advising physicians to stop prescribing DES to pregnant women.”).
317. But see Payton v. Abbot Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181–82 (Mass. 1982) (offering
a confusing result where recovery was circumscribed along the same lines as the NIP
rationale).
318. In re N.Y. Cty. DES Litig., 678 N.E.2d 474, 476, (N.Y. 1997) (expanding the
time allowable to sue).
319. See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 669 (1926).
320. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980) (pioneering market
share liability in diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) cases where identification of the manufacturer
of the drug that injured a plaintiff is impossible. DES was a “drug administered to plaintiff’s
mother . . . for the purposes of preventing miscarriage”); see also Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1070 (N.Y. 1989) (adopting market share liability in DES cases).
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of proof for establishing liability has been relaxed; they need not even
prove the identity of the defendant manufacturer, and their statute of
limitations has been enlarged.
Now let us compare this situation to that of Lana, from our
introductory hypothetical. Lana’s genes were genetically altered, but she,
herself, sustains no diagnosable harm. Instead, she gives birth to a child
with a causally-related genetic disease. Part II illustrated that this child
could not recover, as the claims have been squirreled away under the
theory of wrongful life. But the divergence of WGM cases with general
negligence law becomes even more clearly apparent in this context. Not
only would the child be barred from suit, but so would Lana. Thus,
although the wrongful birth claim—i.e., the parent’s claim for damages
when their child is born harmed—is allowed in most jurisdictions,321 it is
not allowed here. Why? Because the NIP infection has spread. Not only
would the child not have been born but for the genetic intervention—but
neither would Lana.
The wordsmithing involved in side-stepping liability becomes
apparent when comparing language from Gleitman v. Cosgrove:322
The semantic argument whether an unborn child is “a person in being”
seems to us to be beside the point. There is no question that conception
sets in motion biological processes which if undisturbed will produce
what everyone will concede to be a person in being. If in the
meanwhile these processes can be disrupted, resulting in harm to the
child when born, it is immaterial whether before birth the child is
considered a person in being. And regardless of analogies to other
areas of the law, justice requires that the principle be recognized that a
child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.323

Yet, notwithstanding such august language, the court denied the
child’s recovery because the claim was couched as one preventing the
mother from obtaining an abortion, which would have terminated the
child’s existence. In other words, the court framed the case as one claiming
that the child’s very life was wrongful, “since were it not for the act of
birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts
from under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to
prove his damage.”324
321. See, e.g., Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 422 (R.I. 1997).
322. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 691–92 (N.J. 1967) (citing Smith v.
Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960) (where a child in utero received injuries when his
mother was in an automobile accident)) abrogated by Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J.
1979). Gleitman was also a failure to advise the mother that her German measles could
affect the fetus she was carrying at the time, denied also on lack of causation grounds. Id.
323. Id. at 692–93. While the court in Gleitman denied recovery for wrongful life, it
is to be noted that this case arose prior to Roe v. Wade conferred the right of abortion on
the mother. Id.; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
324. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692.
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THE WAY FORWARD

There are three ways out of this conundrum. First, the courts can
recognize the error of their ways and allow recompense under traditional
tort theory. Second, an entirely new approach can be constructed, such as
Professor Fox’s reproductive negligence. The latter will undoubtedly take
time for traction to root, but is probably more likely than expecting the
judiciary to do an abrupt about-face. As one prescient law student wrote
in a similar context, “the weight of precedent is simply too great, and the
emotional and ethical pull of the subject too strong for the American courts
to correct themselves and do justice to children born disabled due to the
negligence of another.”325
Or we can create a third or hybrid solution, one utilizing or
repurposing existing legal theory and tailoring it to the present conundrum.
With this approach in mind, we proceed:
The difference between WGM and reproductive malpractice cases
(stemming from failure to prevent pregnancy or allow its termination) has
been dissected above. In cases of WGM, we have parents who want a
child—and a child who is not claiming a right not to be born. Instead, both
are claiming damages for the defects related to the child’s birth which are
directly caused by third parties. The remaining obstacle is circumventing
the NIP, which bars the child’s right to sue because but for the negligence
this child would not have been born.
The similarity between this situation and the DES cases is obvious.
Hence, it behooves courts to realize that WGM cases are a disparate branch
of case law where different legal outcomes are generated by the same
situation, meaning injured children and harmed parents are barred from
bringing suit in some cases and not others. Nevertheless, another route
exists to allow the child’s recovery: the time-honored method of creating
a legal fiction.326
A.

The Legal Fiction and the Legal Person

To begin, we need an entity capable both of suffering harm and
eligible to sue. In other words, we need a legal person.327 “To be a legal
person is to be the subject of rights and duties.”328 Strictly speaking, the
child born of WGM is a legal person, as that child clearly has rights and
duties. But, according to philosophers, the legal person we have here, the
325. Sohn, supra note 230, at 172.
326. See VISA A.J. KURKI, A THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD 20–22 (2019)
(explaining that a legal fiction is a “consciously false statement” designed to create a status
of personhood enabling rights where otherwise they may be lacking, and in answer to the
question: ‘Who is the Law for?’ . . . noting the “protection of moral persons is the point of
law, and such persons should be recognized as legal persons”).
327. See generally Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283 (1928).
328. Id.
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child, has not been harmed, or if the child has been harmed, the negligently
created harm also occasioned the child’s birth, nullifying the capacity to
sue.329 With all due respect to the philosophers, clearly, this child has been
harmed. But no matter, to humor the philosophers we can create a “legal
person” who has both been harmed and also has the right to sue for such
harm—via a legal fiction.330
To create such a legal person, what “we really need to do is to
overhaul the doctrine of personality . . . . [and] point out some of the nonlegal factors which have found their way into the discussion . . . .” 331
“What ‘person’ signifies in popular speech, or in psychology, or in
philosophy or morals, would be irrelevant . . . .”332 Paradoxically, we
might recognize that philosophy may not be well-suited to address the
legal dilemma presented here. 333
Let us return to focusing on the legal status of this hypothetical
person. “For legal science, the notion of person is and should remain a
purely juridical notion.”334 “[P]ut roughly, ‘person’ signifies what law
makes it signify,”335 or to paraphrase Humpty Dumpty,336 in law, “‘person’
means what the law makes it mean . . . .”337 The “legal person” is defined
as: “the subject of rights and duties.” 338 Or, “[t]o confer legal rights or to
impose legal duties, therefore, is to confer legal personality.” 339
329. I suggest it is time to disavow the philosophical connection in the legal context.
Thus, as the scholar John Dewey writes: “[I]t is even more markedly true that old non-legal
doctrines which once served to advance rules of law may be obstructive today. We often
go on discussing problems in terms of old ideas when the solution of the problem depends
upon getting rid of the old ideas, and putting in their place concepts more in accord with
the present state of ideas and knowledge.” See Dewey, supra note 319, at 657.
330. Legal Fiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An assumption that
something is true even though it may be untrue, made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter
how a legal rule operates.”).
331. Dewey, supra note 319, at 658.
332. Id. at 656.
333. The infiltration of the NIP into law in this situation may be another example of
philosophy co-opting the law when it is wholly inapt, as occurred in the Daubert case when
the lawyers conscripted Popper’s definition of science to the legal arena. As I have
previously shown, Popper’s view of science was derived from the world of quantum
physics and is wholly inapt to the sciences of the courtroom: biology, chemistry and
Newtonian (simple) physics. See generally Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws of ‘Falsifiability’ and ‘Falsification,’
22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 21 (2016).
334. Dewey, supra note 319, at 659 (quoting Leon Michoud, La Notion de
Personnalité Morale, 11 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1, 8 (1899) (Fr.)).
335. Id. at 655.
336. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 205 (Dial Press 1934) (1871)
(“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what
I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”).
337. Dewey, supra note 319, at 659 (“Considerations extraneous to law are here
nominally excluded . . . .”).
338. See Smith, supra note 328, at 283.
339. Id.
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Reciprocally stated, “[p]redictability of societal action . . . determines
rights and duties and rights and duties determine legal personality.”340 And
“to term a ‘natural’ person a person341 in the legal sense is to confer upon
it a new, additive and distinctive meaning . . . .”342
We create our legal person, then, merely by conferring legal rights on
the entity,343 as was done with the creation of the corporate entity.344 Thus,
prior to the embodiment of the legal fiction casting the corporation as a
“body” with rights and obligations, that entity was a conglomeration of
individuals, confederated by a contract, but nothing more.345 But now, by
virtue of legal abracadabra,346 the corporation is a fictional entity now
conceived of as a person, with rights. 347 Those rights include whatever the
law deigns to bequeath to it, 348 including the right to sue for harms
suffered.
Similarly, we will create a legal fiction to stand in for the child born
of WGM; let us call it the conceptual being. We now assign the conceptual

340. Id.
341. The term “person” derived from the Latin “persona” or “mask” and implies some
sort of considered affect one designs to effect, i.e., a mask. See Bonbrest v. Kotz,
65 F. Supp. 138, 140 n.13, 141–43 (D.D.C. 1946) (noting the inanity of blindly following
precedent, the court traced the origin of disallowing prenatal torts to the outdated legal
fiction that a child en ventre sa mere was part and parcel of the mother. In its opinion, the
court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes who said “‘the life of the law has been not logic: it has
been experience’ and here we find a willingness to face the facts of life rather than a myopic
and specious resort to precedent to avoid attachment of responsibility where it ought to
attach and to permit idiocy, imbecility, paralysis, loss of function, and like residuals of
another’s negligence to be locked in the limbo of uncompensable wrong, because of a legal
fiction, long outmoded”). It is befitting that to redress the far-reaching effects of this
outmoded legal fiction, a new one should be substituted in its place, i.e., ‘the conceptual
being.’
342. Dewey, supra note 319, at 657.
343. Smith, supra note 327, at 283.
344. Dewey, supra note 319, at 655–73.
345. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Persons and Personhood, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019, 6:26 PM), https://bit.ly/35F9JSq (“Both corporations and
natural persons are legal persons, but they have different sets of legal rights and duties.
Nonetheless, legal personhood is usually accompanied by the right to own property and the
capacity to sue and be sued.” (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAW 115–131 (1909)).
346. Abra cadabra derives from the Kabalistic intonation “Avra C’Dabra,” meaning
“I will create according to what I say”; or “will create as I speak,” i.e., that the act of speech
will magically create new realities. See Julian Sinclair, Abracadabra, JEWISH CHRON. (July
5, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://bit.ly/36sh3kG.
347. Smith, supra note 327, at 284 (“[A] legal person, therefore, . . . [is] ‘any being
to whom the law attributes a capacity of interests and, therefore, of rights. . . .’” (quoting
JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 273 (5th ed. 1916))).
348. Dewey, supra note 319, at 669 (“The dialectic of the courts, under the pressure
of social facts, was equal to declaring that corporations, while artificial and fictitious,
nevertheless had all the natural rights of an individual person, since after all they were legal
persons.”).
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being the right to avenge injuries suffered by it,349 or the person in whose
shoes s/he stands. We do this even if the harms were not directed to the
legal party, but rather (for instance) to his or her mother, or the person in
whose stead s/he was born. We can imagine, should the courts wish to
entertain theological implications, that the conceptual being was endowed
with life precisely for the purpose of holding the perpetrator responsible
for wrongs done to it (and others).
The next step involves timing. We now assign “legal person” status350
to our conceptual being at a point after its gestation, such that the act
responsible for its coming into being is truncated from the act which both
causes it to be born (fertilization) and its suffering harm. In other words,
we divide and break the causal chain between the act causing life (uniting
sperm and egg) and the act causing harm (negligent manipulation,
wrongful choice of gamete, or wrongful implantation). We do so by
designing the legal birth of the conceptual being (along with the rights
incident to it) to arise after its metaphysical birth or conception. That the
negligent acts occur prior to conception (or in this case, fertilization) does
not void the exercise, as the law allows redress for harms even in those
cases.351
We can confer on this conceptual being additional rights—any and
all we desire—because, after all, it is a fiction.352 Direct action by the
conceptual being would certainly be permitted.353 Her claims could
include unjust enrichment,354 such claims being one of the beacons of
349. Id. at 659 (“The word signifies simply a subject of rights-duties, [sujet de droit]
a being capable of having the subjective rights properly belonging to him.” (alterations in
original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Leon Michoud, La Notion de Personnalité
Morale, 11 REVUE DU DROIT PUB. 1, 8 (1899) (Fr.))).
350. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Persons and Personhood, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/2sY7rQM (noting that “the term ‘person’ is a
normative (legal, moral, or ethical) term, which refers to a moral and/or legal status that
creatures or other bearers of human-like capacities can share with normal adult
humans . . .”).
351. See infra Section V.B. The body of pre-conception tort cases arises out of
negligence directed at the mother which later harms the child. In WGM, by comparison,
the harms are directed at an embryo or gamete which later becomes the child. The
difference in the situations surfaces in the context of the NIP because the acts of negligence
in WGM both cause the harm and the birth. In the pre-conception cases there is no direct
connection between the harm to the mother and birth of the particular child. Nevertheless,
it is curious that this body of law has not been raised in the sperm bank cases referred to at
the outset.
352. Dewey, supra note 319, at 668 n.17 (“If the corporate personality is imaginary,
there is no limit to the characteristics and capacities which may be attributed to that
personality.” (quoting Arthur Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 347–
48 (1910))).
353. See Robert H. Johnson, Shareholders’ Right to Direct Recovery in Derivative
Suits, 17 WYO. L.J. 208, 208–13 (1963).
354. See Scott v. Pro Mgmt. Servs. Grp., 2 N.Y.S.3d 90, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(“Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is direct, and not derivative . . . . Further, plaintiff’s
allegations that defendants were enriched by their receipt of revenues and other
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direct actions355 in corporate litigation.356 And what more could qualify as
unjust enrichment than a sperm bank that acts negligently, charges
exorbitantly, and is shielded from legal exposure?357 The conceptual being
could also claim derivative damages where the parental choice of gamete
was interrupted (switched or not as represented), resulting in harm to both
parent and child. This claim would be modeled after a loss of consortium
claim in personal injury actions,358 as “the law has long recognized that a
wrong done to one person may invade the protected rights of one who is
intimately related to the first.”359 The same rationale could be used to
bolster the claim of the conceptual being who is suing in the stead of the
hypothetical child who would have been born had different gametes been
selected.
B.

Pre-Conception Injury to the Rescue

We have already seen that an infant has a cause of action for prenatal
torts.360 A body of case law expands this recovery to cases where the
negligence occurred not only in utero, but even pre-conception.361
consideration at his expense, and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit
them to retain such consideration without adequately compensating him, are sufficient to
state a claim for unjust enrichment.”); see also Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 973
N.E.2d 743, 745–46 (N.Y. 2012); Gjuraj v. Uplift Elevator Corp., 973 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
355. For more on distinguishing derivative actions from direct ones in corporate
litigation, see WENJING CHEN, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FUNDING SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION 15–51 (2017).
356. See, e.g., Scott, 2 N.Y.S.3d at 91; Shareholder Has Standing to Assert Unjust
Enrichment Claim, SCHLAM STONE & DOLAN LLP: COM. DIVISION BLOG (Jan. 19, 2015),
https://bit.ly/2kFYHuH.
357. Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 48.
358. See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 888, 892 (Ill. 1960) (allowing a
derivative action where a wife is entitled to damages for loss of consortium due to the
negligent injury of her husband since the law has long recognized that a wrong done to one
person may invade the protected rights of one who is intimately related to the first).
359. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (citing Dini v.
Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1960)); see also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (1953) (noting the nature of the relationship between the parties
harmed dictates a limited area of transferred negligence).
360. See, e.g., Huskey v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 596, 596 (Ala. 1972).
361. Id.; see also Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1251, 1255–56 (holding that a child who
was entitled to bring a cause of action for negligence occurring before here conception
which caused her damage, in this case mistyped blood); see also Cowe v. Forum Grp.,
Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 964–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a child injured in utero
may seek damages for prenatal torts), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 575 N.E.2d 630
(Ind. 1991); Pay Me Now or Pay me Later: The Question of Prospective Damage Claims
for Genetic Injury in Wrongful Life Cases, 23 IND. L. REV. 753, 753–54 (1990); cf. Pitre v.
Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988) (“[W]e reject defendant’s
arguments calling for a categorical denial of any duty . . . to protect an unconceived child
from being born with a birth defect. . . . [E]ach person owes a duty to take reasonable care
to avoid acts or omissions which he can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure a
present or future member of society. . . . Additionally these defendants are in a much better
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Although relevant and elucidative, some of these cases are still somewhat
distinguishable from the ones we deal with here, because the harm to the
child is not related to the fact of its birth. When a legal variant of the NIP
rationale was invoked, however, recovery has been denied on a similar
rationale.362 Nevertheless, even when denying recovery, the dicta is
compelling. For example, as one court noted, “[t]he persons at whose
disposal society has placed the potent implements of technology owe a
heavy moral obligation to use them carefully and to avoid foreseeable
harm to present or future generations.”363 These cases also tell us that
“[l]ogic and sound policy require a recognition of a legal duty to a child
not yet conceived but foreseeably harmed by the negligent delivery of
health care services to the child’s parents,”364 citing risk spreading,
prevention, and deterrence functions of law as rationale.365
In fact, there is precedent for allowing recovery for pre-conception
torts in instances reminiscent of those before us. Courts have specifically
held “that it is not necessary that the legal duty be owed to one in existence
position than the victims to analyze the risks involved . . . and to either take precautions to
avoid them or to insure against them.”). Nevertheless, the court denied the child’s claim on
foreseeability (legal causation) grounds. See Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1162.
362. See Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9, 11–12 (Mass. 1990) (denying claims
of a child born with a genetic defect but allowing the parents’ claim for negligent
preconception counseling which led the child’s birth—including emotional
damages).”[Because the child] would not have been born if the defendant had not been
negligent, [hence] there is a fundamental problem of logic if [the child] were allowed to
recover against the defendant in a negligence-based tort action.” Id. at 12–13. See also
Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 181–82 (Mass. 1982) (an early DES case where
recovery was partially denied on the basis that “[t]he provider of the probable means of a
plaintiff’s very existence should not be liable for unavoidable, collateral consequences of
the use of that means”). The Payton analysis bears mention. Finding the comparison to
wrongful life cases as not “compelling” because the plaintiffs were not claiming the child
would have been better off not being born, the court nonetheless embraced these holdings,
although the court did recognize a claim of in utero harm if the drug was not related to the
plaintiff’s birth. Id. at 181–85. The dissent of Chief Judge Hennessey is remarkable: “[T]he
majority’s affirmative answer provides a negligent manufacturer of a life sustaining
product with an excuse from liability whenever it can show that its product probably saved
a plaintiff’s life.” Id. at 191 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting).
363. Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1157 (“When a physician knows or should know of the
existence of an unreasonable risk that a child will be born with a birth defect, he owes a
duty to the unconceived child as well as to its parents to exercise reasonable care in warning
the potential parents and in assisting them to avoid the conception of the deformed child. . .
. . [Further,] . . . persons at whose disposal society has placed the potent implements of
technology owe a heavy moral obligation to use them carefully and to avoid foreseeable
harm to present or future generations.”). Moreover, it should be noted that “[[t]he moral
factor is important in the appreciation of causation.” Id. at 1159 (citing F.H. LAWSON,
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 64 (1962)).
364. Id. at 1157; see also Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 24, 26 (8th Cir. 1978)
(allowing the child’s preconception tort allegedly occurring as a result of negligent uterine
repair years earlier). But see Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981)
(denying recovery to a plaintiff child with severe brain damage resulting from negligent
perforation to the mother’s uterus).
365. See Pitre, 530 So. 2d at 1157.
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at the time of the wrongful act.”366 Thus, in Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital,367 “the negligent force . . . was set in motion years prior to
plaintiff’s conception. . . . [But] the appellate court found no reason to
deny a cause of action to a person simply because he had not yet been
conceived at the time of the wrongful conduct.”368 Therein, the court
allowed the child “not conceived at the time negligent acts were committed
against its mother, [to] have a cause of action against the tortfeasors for its
injuries resulting from their conduct[.]”369 Additionally, in Walker v.
Rinck, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “a child has a viable cause of
action for injuries allegedly resulting from the negligence of a physician
and a medical laboratory prior [to his] conception.”370 However, the court
took pains to explain that the framing of the claim was dispositive. Noting
that the Indiana statute specifically prohibits suits “based on the claim that
but for the negligent conduct of another he would have been aborted,”371
the court rejected the defendant’s attempted commingling of wrongful life,
which is barred, with pre-conception torts, which are allowed.372
Similarly, the significance of framing and timing surfaces again in
Monusko v. Postle.373 Therein, the child was born with Rubella-associated
defects because of a claimed failure to test and immunize her mother prior
to the child’s conception,374 similar to the situation in Greco v. United
366. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251, 1256 (Ill.
1977) (citing Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626 (N.Y. 1887); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849
(Ill. App. Ct. 1963); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973); Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)); see also Fleming James
Jr., Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 778, 788–89 (1953); Note, The
Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
554, 566 n.77 (1962) (allowing a child’s recovery where her mother had been transfused
with Rh incompatible blood nearly a decade before her conception, sensitizing the mother
and causing the child’s disability).
367. See Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
368. Id.; see also Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort
Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful
Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1435–38 (1979).
369. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d. at 1251, 1256. In dicta apt for the cases against sperm
banks, the court noted, “[w]e believe that there is a right to be born free from prenatal
injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child’s mother.” Id. at 1255.
370. Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1992).
371. Id. at 593 (quoting IND. CODE § 34-1-1-11 (repealed 1998)).
372. Id. at 593–94.
373. Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 368–69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
374. Id. at 368–69 (asking “[w]hether there was a duty under these circumstances
[failing to administer a rubella vaccine pre-pregnancy, where the child was born with
rubella-syndrome] to a plaintiff who was not in being at the time of a wrongful act[,]” to
which the court concluded in the affirmative, claiming existence of a duty derives from
foreseeability of harm: “The question of duty depends in part on ‘forseeability–whether it
is forseeable that the actor’s conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and whether
the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable.’” (first quoting Renslow
v Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1260 (Ill. 1977) (Dooley, J., concurring); then
quoting Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 765 (Mich. 1977)).
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States.375 In the former case, the child’s claims were allowed, in the latter
(where the mother’s rubella during pregnancy was not detected) the child’s
claim for wrongful life was denied.376
Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc.377 is also analogous
to the situation before us. Therein, the plaintiff alleged that a birth-control
product ingested by his wife altered her chromosome structure.378 After
ceasing ingestion of the pill, the woman conceived and birthed twins born
with Mongolism.379 The plaintiff claimed damages for the children’s
personal injuries including retardation, deformity, and pain and suffering
as a result of their mother’s ingesting the drug prior to conception.380 The
Tenth Circuit ruled that “the pleading should not be . . . limited to effects
or developments before conception,” and upheld the children’s claim.381
Significantly, the court in Jorgensen382 refused to await legislative
action to allow the claim. Pointedly noting the traditional role of the
highest court of a state is to determine the common law of that state, the
opinion applies this role even if such determinations result in innovative
growth of the common law.383 “The strength and genius of the common
law [says the court] lies in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the
society it governs.”384
In sum, where negligence occurs pre-conception, liability has been
recognized. The harm is not to a specific individual, but to any child
eventually born of this negligence, and the potential universe of postnegligent plaintiffs is unbounded. Legally speaking, any child harmed by
pre-conception injuries should be able to sue for damages. The NIP only
rears its ugly head when a specific child is harmed by the pre-conception
or pre-gestation injury. This occurs via interposing the negligent act
causing the child’s harm with an act occasioning the child’s birth. In some
pre-conception tort cases, courts refuse to saddle defendants with liability
if their negligent acts were inextricably intertwined with the infant’s birth.
However, a parallel body of cases, the DES literature, allows children born
375. Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347–51 (Nev. 1995).
376. See id. at 351; see also Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Mich.
1971).
377. See generally Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973) (reinstating suit on behalf of children allegedly injured as the result of mother’s birth
control pill usage).
378. Id. at 239.
379. Id. at 238.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 239; see also Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25–26 (8th Cir.
1978) (holding that under Missouri law a child stated a cause of action against two doctors
in a hospital for injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a negligently performed
Caesarean section upon the child’s mother several years prior to the child’s birth).
382. See Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 237.
383. Id.; see also Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972).
384. Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ind. 1992) (quoting Brooks, 284 N.E.2d
at 797).
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as a result of negligence (and injured pre-birth) to raise a claim for
damages. Taking these holdings in concert suggests that precedent exists
where the legal outcome is vastly different from the philosophical, even
though the type of damages is similar or at least analogous. The
unfortunate wrinkle posed by the NIP, then, can be dealt with by creating
the fictional conceptual being.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rejection of wrongful life in WGM is clearly a holdover from
cases involving wrongful deprivation of abortion and the societal
ambivalence—or even anathema—surrounding that right. These cases are
wholly aberrant in the instant context. Neither a claim of the “sanctity of
life” nor its mysteries should preclude a child born suffering negligent
harm occasioned pre-implantation from suing. In fact, a retinue of cases
exists which specifically provides such a right where the mother is injured
pre-conception, causing harm to a child subsequently born in a genre of
cases called pre-conception injury. At least four states—Illinois,
Michigan, Indiana, and Louisiana—and two federal circuit courts—the
Eighth and Tenth—allow for pre-conception injuries.385
In conclusion, the ban against wrongful life in WGM cases (i.e.,
where gametes were switched or damaged prior to implantation) is entirely
misplaced. The rationale given for denying such claims is irrelevant in the
context of harm caused by modern reproductive technologies used to
facilitate conceiving or birthing a child. First, under the misplaced guise
of morality, courts refuse to assign blame in these cases, thereby leaving
it to philosophers to sort it out, when at least some philosophers clearly
believe that wrongdoing—is wrong. Second, morality and law demand
that the wrongdoer—especially one making a profit—offer recompense
for harms caused, if only for the purpose of deterrence. Third, reliance on
Parfit’s NIP is misapplied in these cases. Parfit is well-concerned with
preventing children from being born with a disease, even if another child
is born in her/his stead. When the issue is no child versus a different, but
healthy, child, Parfit clearly comes down in favor of the second choice.
Let us now revisit the implanted embryos of He Jiankui, imagining
they sustain some future injury caused by his faulty manipulation of their
DNA. But for He Jiankui’s selection of these embryos for
experimentation, they would not have been implanted and, hence, would
not have been born. Under the present understanding (and rejection) of
wrongful life claims, the children should be precluded from suit. Yet,
would the law shield the notorious He Jiankui after he has been thoroughly

385. See supra Section V.B.
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lambasted by the press386 and the scientific community?387 It appears not.
Why, then, should his actions be legally protected?
While society wrings its hands and wags its finger at perpetrators of
what it calls genetic abuses, this Article argues that recent advances in
technology, including PGT and IVF along with genetic engineering
resulting in genetic errors, warrant resurrecting the wrongful life claim
reformulated as WGM. Brought by a fictional person, the conceptual
being, these claims would sound in negligence, unjust enrichment, as well
as nuisance.388 These claims would fill a deterrence function as well as
provide restorative, corrective, and “therapeutic justice.”
Other concerns remain. Amongst the thorniest are the conflicting
rights of the disabled community, which champions foreclosing or limiting
genetic testing and selection, and rejects the children’s claims,389 alongside
those who fear the eugenics implications. Layered over bioethical issues
are tensions in legal doctrine and policy. What happens when the diseases
are discovered decades after the wrong? Does conventional legal doctrine,
such as a statute of limitations, trump redress available to the wronged
parties?390
The continued and rapid advance in the field of genetic engineering
and the lacuna in legal avenues of redress signal that much work in the
legal arena awaits us.

386. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 81.
387. See, e.g., Jim Stump, Human Embryo Gene Editing: We Need to Think This
Through Carefully (An Interview with Francis Collins), BIOLOGOS (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2kWdMIo.
388. See Billauer, Sperminator, supra note 13, at 38–48.
389. See, e.g., Embryo Checks “should be widened,” supra note 73.
390. Or is some sort of tolling provision, such as envisioned in the asbestos and DES
cases, warranted?

